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ABSTRACT 
Since the end of the Cold W ar in 1989-1991, NATO has engaged m ore 
extensively in expeditionary operations designe d to establish and m aintain stability in 
war-torn countries.  From  the Bal kans to  Afghanistan, NATO’s special operations 
shortfall has been illum inated.  At the Ri ga Summit in Novem ber 2006, NATO leaders 
decided to develop an  Allianc e s pecial operations capa bility.  The  NATO Specia l 
Operations Forces Tran sformation Initiativ e (N STI) was agreed upon as the m eans by 
which the Allie s would improve such capabilitie s.  This thesis investigates the exten t to 
which NATO requires robust special operations capabilities similar to U.S. capabilities in 
order to respond to cu rrent and future th reats.  Because th reats in the p ost-11 September 
2001 environment are largely unc onventional, NATO must deve lop a capability that can 
meet these threats in kind.  The need to face and overcome unconventional adversaries is 
likely to increase as the scope of NATO’s military operations extends to areas far from its 
traditional geopolitical space.   T his th esis concludes th at th e NSTI’s ob jective—to 
enhance the special operation s capabilities of the Allies—is well-founded and shou ld be 
properly funded and supported by appropriate command arrangements. 
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An apparen t shortf all in the Allian ce’s Special Operations Forces  (SOF)  
capability was illum inated during operations  in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. A  few 
Allies em ployed SOF unilatera lly and com pletely outside the realm of  NATO’s 
Command and Control (C2) structu re.  More recently, sin ce 2003, the Alliance has  led 
the UN-m andated Inter national Sec urity A ssistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and 
operations in this country have  illum inated the SOF shortfa ll even further as the local 
security environment has deteriorated.   
At the Riga Summ it in Nove mber 2006, NATO leaders decided to develop an 
Alliance sp ecial opera tions c apability.  The  NATO Special Operation s For ces 
Transformation Initiativ e (NSTI) was agreed  u pon as the m eans by which the Allies  
would improve SOF capabili ties throughout the Alliance. 1  In the words of Paul Gallis, 
“At Riga, the allies launched an initiative to develop a core of availab le SOF, which they 
might call upon for operations. NATO is attempting to build forces for irregular, counter-
insurgency warfare, for which SOF are well-suited.” 2  However, in light of the 
capabilities gaps am ong the contributing Al lies and NATO’s burden- sharing philosophy 
in m ilitary operations, there a re o bvious s hortcomings in m eeting SOF require ments 
which must be addressed if NSTI is to be successful. 
In 2007, General J ames Jones, USMC, a for mer Suprem e Allied Commander-
Europe (SACEUR), wrote that “to day’s convergence of multip le unconventional threats 
                                                 
1 GEN Bantz J. Craddock, “Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee,” 15 March 2007 
http://www.eucom.mil/english/command/posture/HASC%20-%20Craddock_Testimony031507.pdf 
(accessed 22 July 2008).  For specific language regarding NSTI see Item 24, “Riga Summit Declaration,” 
NATO Press Releases, 29 November 2006, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm (accessed 15 
August 2008). 
2 Paul Gallis, “The NATO Summit at Riga, 2006,” CRS Report for Congress, RS22529, 20 December 
2006. 
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across the strategic continuum  requires a new focus on transfor ming the unconventional 
aspects of Alliance military capability.”3  W hile unconventional an d asymmetric threats 
such as terrorism persist in the current  period, som e may wonder why NATO requires a 
SOF capability when ea ch m ember state  of  the Alliance  has  nationa l la w enf orcement 
capabilities that are responsib le for confronting asymm etric threats.  This fact was 
demonstrated in May 20 08 when law enforcement agencies  from three NATO European  
nations—France, Germ any and the Netherlands—conducted coordinated 
counterterrorism (CT) operations, w hich resulted in the arrest of 10 individuals with ties 
to al-Qaeda.4  This was but one of a num ber of CT operations that ha ve been conducted 
in Europe by national law enforcement personnel, and it raises m any questions about the 
actual requirement that NATO has for SOF.  To what exten t are NATO SOF necessary ?  
What roles and m issions should they have?   What specific threats does NATO believe 
cannot be addressed by  curren t law  enfor cement and conv entional m ilitary forces and 
therefore require the developm ent of a special operation s cap ability?  Is the strategic  
value inhe rent to SOF a tool that N ATO intends to use in achieving o bjectives in  the 
global security environment? 
B. HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis investigates  the hypothes is that NATO requires SOF capabilities th at 
parallel U.S. SOF capabilities to resp ond to curre nt and future threats.  Since the end  of 
the Cold W ar in 1989-1991, NATO has engaged more extensively in expeditionary 
operations designed to establish and m aintain stability in distant countries, as opposed to 
the original institutional pur pose of collective defense as defined by Articles 5 and 6 of 
                                                 
3 James L. Jones, “A Blueprint for Change: Transforming NATO Special Operations,” Joint Forces 
Quarterly, 45 (2d Qtr 2007), 37 http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i45/11.pdf (accessed 7 
July 2008). 
4 John Leicester, Associated Press, “10 arrested in France, Germany, Netherlands in terror probe,” The 
Boston Globe, 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2008/05/17/10_arrested_in_france_germany_netherlan
ds_in_terror_probe/ (accessed 21 July 2008). 
 3
the North Atlantic Tre aty.5  Because security threats in the post-11 Septem ber 2001 
environment are largely asymmetric and unc onventional, NATO must develop a m ilitary 
capability that can meet these threats  in kind and achieve decisive superiority over the m 
swiftly and with m inimal adve rse impact to Al liance m embers.  This thesis  iden tifies 
tasks and missions that are idea lly suited to the specialized military operations that only 
SOF can conduct, as well as the operations  that should be the responsibility of 
conventional m ilitary forces and national law enforcem ent agencies.  As the scop e of  
NATO’s m ilitary oper ations extend s to area s f arther away  f rom its tr aditional Eu ro-
Atlantic area, the need to face and overco me asymmetric and unconventional adversaries 
is likely to increase. 
This thes is also ana lyzes the pote ntial f or Alliance m embers to con tribute to  
NATO SOF, given the fact that the SOF capabilities of many countries in the Alliance are 
less robust than those of the Un ited States.  SOF in each Alliance member are organized 
based on requirem ents determined by the m ember nation itself , irrespective of potential 
strategic designs that N ATO may have.  W ith that in m ind, it m ay be assum ed that the 
tasks and missions expected of Allies c ontributing to the NSTI  m ay be beyond their 
capabilities, and that a dditional tas ks and missions m ay be lim ited so lely to Alliance 
members with robust and highly capable SOF th at are well-trained in all facets of SOF 
roles and missions. 
C. IMPORTANCE 
As the name im plies, SOF are forces that are capable of accom plishing missions 
that conven tional m ilitary forces  are no t manned, trained, equipped , or exp ected to 
undertake.  Such forces would provide NATO va stly improved capabilities to respond to 
combat and cris is contingencies wherever th ey may arise, a nd to elim inate the pote ntial 
for cris es to  em erge at all.  These for ces can, if properly task ed and employed, yield 
strategic benefits to the Alliance in pursuit of its political objectives.  Yet political factors 
may act as a constraint in practice as  a result of the luxury each Allian ce member has in 
                                                 
5 “The North Atlantic Treaty,” NATO E-Library, 4 April 1949, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (accessed 22 August 2008). 
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limiting the roles tha t its  forces play in NAT O operations.  National caveats, red cards, 
and selective contributions have the potential to negate  any benefits  NATO S OF m ay 
provide. 
There is also the issue of consensus in the Allian ce.  The NATO decision-making 
process is b ased on con sensus among Allianc e members in the North  Atlantic Council 
(NAC), which is a bod y com posed of  represen tatives of  th e Allianc e m embers.  This 
arrangement lends itself to delays, which coul d severely limit the ef fectiveness of SOF, 
particularly in cris is situations whe re tim e is of the essence.  For NATO SOF to be 
effective, NATO governm ents m ight have to devise an exem ption to the standard 
decision making process—perhaps a pre-delega tion of operational authority to SACEUR 
in certain contingencies.  Even the NAT O Response Force (NRF ), designed to be 
NATO’s “rapid response in the initial phase of  a crisis situation,” cannot deploy in less 
than five days, currently has lim ited de dicated SOF ca pability, and requires the  
authorization of the NAC in order to mobilize.6 
NATO’s relevance in  the global sec urity environment of the 21st century cannot 
be over-emphasized.  The Allianc e’s perf ormance in Afghanistan is  being watched  
closely and debated by  Allies and n on-allies alike.  The  key issues include the  potential 
for success, exit criteria, and re sponsibilities in bringing peac e to a distant country at the 
expense of national blood and treasure.  Global security challenges require a capability to 
respond globally; and asymmetr ic or unconventional threats demand specialized forces 
that are manned, trained and equipped to confront and overcome them. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literatu re about th e theory and em ployment of SOF is vast.  Sim ilarly, th e 
literature ab out NATO stra tegy and  transf ormation is exten sive.  However, litera ture 
which bridges the two subjects is sparse.   
                                                 
6 “NATO Response Force - NRF,” Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Allied Command 
Operations, http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm (accessed 20 July 2008). 
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The 1990s witnessed a dram atic change in NATO’s foc us as the Alliance 
intervened in the conf licts in the B alkans.  It was the f irst tim e the c ollective def ense 
Alliance engaged in military operations outside the geographic boundaries of its  member 
states.  I t also served a s a benchmark f or the Alliance ’s f uture s trategy that exp anded 
beyond collective defense, a m ission that has never been abandoned, toward strategic 
engagement in support of broader security objectives shared by the Alliance members.  In 
his treatise on the evolving ro le of NATO, David Yost noted that the contem porary role 
of the Alliance is one in which the collec tive defense responsibilities are retained, while 
greater attention is devoted to collective secu rity requirem ents.7  This is done via two 
new Alliance roles.  Th e first is th rough “cooperation with  former adversaries and  non-
Allies” and the second is “crisis m anagement and peace operations.”  The latter involves 
what Yost terms “security against an extension of war beyond manageable limits.”8   
NATO has revised its Strateg ic C oncept twic e in the wa ke of  the Cold W ar.  
While the curren t Stra tegic Conce pt notes NATO’s indispensable r ole in “m eeting 
current and  future secu rity ch allenges,” it was  written in 1999 and does not directly 
address security challenges conceivabl e in the current post-11 S eptember 2001 
environment.  In fact, in February 2007, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
highlighted the need to address 21s t century security issues and “enshrine them  in our  
guiding documents so that they are implemented in practice."9  De Hoop Scheffer did not 
explicitly identify the th reats that he had in m ind, but it can  be assum ed, in light of  the 
NAC’s subsequent communiqués, that they  include unconventional and asymm etric 
challenges, and will m ost likely call for expeditionary operations in distant lands as well 
as within Europe.   
As a force, SOF have great strateg ic value, but with inherent risks.  For example, 
Eliot Cohen highlighted the potential for SOF to become politicized and to develop an 
                                                 
7 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 270. 
8 Ibid., 270. 
9 Reuters, “NATO Chief Calls for New ‘Strategic Concept’,” International Herald Tribune, 11 
February 2007 http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/11/news/nato.php (accessed 27 August 2008). 
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agenda of t heir own. 10  In an environm ent such as NATO, t here is some potential for 
SOF to become instruments of national polic ies, and this m ight prove counterproductive 
to NATO’s greater objectives.  John Boraws ki and Thom as-Durell Young support this 
statement in writing tha t 21st centu ry NATO prior ities, f orce struc tures and comm and 
arrangements “m ust conf orm less to nationa l and allie d politics than to m ilitary 
exigency.”11  National riv alries and bottlenecks such as the c ommittee consensus model 
described above are perfect examples of the potential obstacles to effective use of SOF in 
NATO. 
Thomas Adam s quotes Defense Departm ent definitions which characterize  
doctrine as consisting o f the “Fundam ental principles by which the m ilitary f orces or  
elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.  It is authoritative 
but requires judgment in application.”12  Hy Rothstein notes that  doctrine must “adapt to 
both the grand strategy of the state and the thre ats” it faces if it is to enhance the state’s  
security, and notes the improbability of a state facing just one threat.13  In an organization 
such as NATO, a complex m arriage of national and inter-governmental politics, that fact 
is m agnified exponentially.  In fact, afte r h is departu re from  the SACEUR position, 
General Jones noted that the consen sus decision-making model had becom e standard in 
the approximately 350 NATO committees.  This tended to reduce the Alliance’s ability to 
agree on issues to a “slow and painful” process.  Moreover, General Jones said, military 
decisions were becom ing excessiv ely influe nced by political considerations, further 
exacerbating the problem.14 
                                                 
10 Eliot Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1978), 53-80. 
11 John Borawski and Thomas-Durell Young, NATO After 2000: The Future of the Euro-Atlantic 
Alliance (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001), ix. 
12 Adams, 13.  Adams cites the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1987), 118. 
13 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 2006), xiv. 
14 David S. Yost, “An Interview with General James L. Jones, USMC, Retired, Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe,” NATO Defense College Research Paper, 34 (January 2008), 3-4, 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/rp_34.pdf (accessed 26 August 2008). 
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Thomas Adams refers to Clausewitz’s famous saying that “war is the continuation 
of politics by other means” as he explains the relationship between war and politic s.  He 
notes that there is an area of overlap betw een the two that is “contentious and poorly-
defined.”  He contends that this area is the realm of SOF, and that it is specifically known 
as unconventional warf are (UW ).15  The very nam e “unconventional warfare” im plies 
that it differs from  the tasks expected of  general purpose (or conventional) forces, and 
includes a wide range of tasks that are well o utside what such forces  are expected to 
achieve.  The greatest benefit of UW lies in the ability to shape the political-m ilitary and 
psychological environm ents in an adversar y or target country toward the overall 
objectives of the nation conducting the operations. 
Christopher La mb and David Tucker hi ghlight the absence of a codified 
examination of the strategic value of SOF, but  note that th ere are a few exam ples.  They 
argue that, as nation al s trategic interests differ, so too m ust the em phasis placed on the 
different SOF m issions and capabilities in support of them .16  It can b e argued that th e 
most significant benefit of having SOF in NATO will reside in their strategic value to the 
Alliance.  Thoughtful analyses of the strategic value of SOF cauti on that SOF should not  
be em ployed to perform inappropriate, non-sp ecialized tactical tasks that could and 
should be the responsibility of conventional forces.17   
It is im portant to have a clear understanding of the core tasks and capabilities of  
SOF.  Certainly, these tasks and capabilitie s vary by nation and co rrespond to national 
priorities, strategy and resource availabil ity.  Published U.S. doctrine provides 
comprehensive details about the core tasks of  U.S. SOF.  NATO doctrine defines core 
tasks as well, but the focus of expected NATO SOF core tasks is narrower than that in  
                                                 
15 Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 18.   
16 Davi d T ucker and  C hristopher J . Lam b, U.S. Special Operations Forces (New York: Co lumbia 
University Press, 2007), 144-145. 
17 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), 
chapter 7.  For further analyses on the strategic use of SOF, see John Arquilla, From Troy to Entebbe: 
Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996). 
Arquilla refers to the strategic use of SOF in his introduction.  Tucker and Lamb go into great detail about 
the strategic value of SOF in chapters 5 and 6 of their book, cited above. 
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U.S. doctrine.  Moreover, experts such as Colin Gray, Thom as Ada ms, David Tucker, 
Christopher Lam b, Da vid Gom pert, and Raym ond Sm ith have contri buted greatly to 
understanding the subject. 
The United States has the broadest and most capable SOF com plement in th e 
Alliance, an d U.S. SOF are able to  res pond to  virtually any contingency across the 
spectrum of SOF m issions.  However, not all Alliance members are able to provide SOF 
that meet the sam e mission standard s set fo r U.S. SOF.  Da vid Gompert and Raymond 
Smith provide an exam ination of Alliance ca pabilities by nation, and th ereby indirectly 
identify gap s in SOF capability th at m ust be  f illed.  These data ar e critical a s they  
facilitate an alytical de termination of  the SO F capabilities that m ust be developed  by  
Alliance members or deemed unnecessary as a core com petency for NATO SOF. 18  This 
thesis critically exam ines several works about the roles and missions of SOF in general, 
and compares them to the tasks that the Allies expect their SOF to be able to accomplish.  
Additional examination of the tasks that NAT O SOF should be realistically expected to 
perform separates what is practical fr om unrealis tic expect ations, given the 
transformation of  the Alliance and the re sident conv entional m ilitary and law  
enforcement capabilities. 
NATO has written SOF doctrine in Allie d Joint Publication-3.5 (AJP-3. 5), Allied 
Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, which is currently in ratification draft status.  The 
document outlines specific ro les an d m issions that NATO SOF should be expected to 
perform.  The fra mework of the docum ent ap pears to be based on that of U.S. Joint 
Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.  In fact, four of the chapters are 
parallel.  The NATO doctrine adds an extra chapter outlining the integration of SOF and 
conventional forces.  However, the NATO doct rine does not address UW as an expected 
core com petency for A lliance SOF, a fact that seem s to be disconnected from  the  
strategic value that SOF offer. 
                                                 
18 David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, “Creating a NATO Special Operations Force,” Defense 
Horizons, 52 (2006), 3. http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/defense_horizons/DH_52.pdf (accessed 4 July 2008). 
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E. METHODOLOGY 
To assess NATO’s requirem ents f or SOF, this thes is f irst exam ines NATO’s 
strategic vision to better understand the Alliance’s perception of the security environment 
that it will face in  the next decade.  NATO’s stra tegic do cuments, including the 1999 
Strategic Concept, provide the Alliance’s guidance and philosophy about the employment 
of its armed forces, and serve as the starti ng point from which to determ ine whether the  
Alliance’s vision is appropriate for the next decade’s security challenges.  NATO’s vision 
of future military operations has evolved to encompass expeditionary missions as a result 
of the radical changes in global security concerns since the most recent Strategic Concept 
was published in 1999.  Given the dynam ic s ecurity environm ent in which NATO is 
currently engaged, and will certainly continue to face in the next decade and beyond, it is  
important to determ ine what role th e Alliance’s nascent SOF will be re quired to f ill as 
part of the NSTI.  Beyond the security  challenges that NATO faces, political 
machinations, red cards, caveats and consensus-formation problems have the potential to 
diminish the NSTI’s presumed benefits. 
This thesis  then takes  the next step in deter mining perceived thre ats to the 
Alliance by using pos ture-relevant statements from Alliance stra tegic documents and an  
assessment of the threats facing NATO today, as well as those that the Alliance stands to 
face in the n ext decade.  Each Ally prioritizes its developm ent of national capabilities to 
meet the th reats that it perceives  as m ost significant.  Ac cording to the Interna tional 
Institute for Strategic Studies, each Europ ean Ally perceives transnational and/or 
asymmetric threats as most salient.19 
This thesis then undertakes an analysis of SOF competencies; that is, the roles and 
missions that SOF are trained, equipped and ex pected to perform better than other forces, 
as well as Alliance m ember states’ current SOF capabilitie s, and NATO SOF doctrine.   
                                                 
19 European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations, ed. Bastian 
Giegerich and Alexander Nicoll (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), 31-39. Table 
3.1 describes the perceived threats and priorities for 41 NATO and non-NATO European countries. 
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This thesis also conside rs which tas ks are best suited for SOF in  NATO, and which are 
best suited for conventional military forces and national law enforcement agencies.   
Finally, this thesis examines the hypothesis that NATO governments agreed to the 
NSTI because they recognized that their abilities to address certain security requirements, 
not only within Alliance countri es but beyond their borders as well, are inadequate.  This 
is particu larly true in light of the fact  that NATO is resolved to conduct m ilitary 
operations in distant countries such as Afghani stan.  On the basis of these assessments,  
this thesis analyzes which m issions NATO SO F are best suited for in NATO’s se curity 
environment and exam ines capabilities, lim itations, challenges and opportunities for 
NATO SOF.   
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized as follows.  Ch apter II examines NATO’s strategic vision 
to better understand the Alliance’s perception o f the security environm ent it will face in 
the next decade.  Chapter III exam ines contemporary threats and secu rity concerns that 
should drive NATO requirem ents for SOF.  Chapter IV discusses NATO’s current 
capability to respond to the threats it faces, and the potential roles and missions of SOF to 
that end.  Chapter V sum s up conclusions regarding the signifi cant opportunities and 
challenges facing the NSTI, and provides an assessm ent of the best em ployment 
strategies for NATO SOF. 
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II. NATO GRAND STRATEGY: EXAMINING THE ALLIANCE’S 
VISION FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SECURITY 
A. OVERVIEW 
From 1949 until 1991,  NATO served to ensu re that the Soviet Union  did not 
attempt to encroach  westward.  Th e coll ective defense of  Alliance m embers was the 
foundation upon which tyranny was to be deterred.  When the Soviet Union collapsed in 
1991, NATO remained, having emerged victorious from the Cold War, but the Alliance’s 
continued f ocus on collective defense was s upplemented by a security strategy that  
included larger security objectives encompassing all of the Euro-Atlantic region.20   
Recognizing the need to adap t to a dram atically changing security environm ent, 
NATO leaders began crafting a new strategy.  Published in November 1991, the Strategic 
Concept outlined the post-Cold W ar vision for the Alliance in co njunction w ith a  
continuing hedge against the residual risk of S oviet aggression or coercio n.  In the m id-
to-late 1990s Russian reactions to NATO enlargement, combined with the lessons learned 
in the wake of  the conf licts in th e Balkans, necessitated  a review of  the Strategic 
Concept.  As a result, the most recent NATO Strategic Concept was published in 1999.  
However, that document was written in the pre-11 September 2001 environment and does 
not accurately reflect th e transformation that NATO has undergone since its publication.  
In spite of NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’s calls to develop a new 
Strategic Concept , the docum ent has not been revised to reflect the new security 
environment.21  The lack of response by the Allian ce could be a result of disagreem ent 
                                                 
20 The Euro-Atlantic region is defined as the territory of all the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe countries.  This territory encompasses Canada and the United States, Europe, 
Turkey, and the former Soviet Union, including Siberian Russia and the former Soviet republics in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia.  This definition is cited in David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s 
New Roles in International Security, (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 3. 
21 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Beyond the Bucharest Summit,” Speech at Brussels Forum, NATO 
Opinions Online, 15 March 2008, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080315a.html (accessed 1 
October 2008).  Earlier calls for revision of the Strategic Concept by the NATO Secretary General are cited 
by Reuters, “NATO Chief Calls for New ‘Strategic Concept’,” International Herald Tribune, 11 February 
2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/11/news/nato.php (accessed 27 August 2008). 
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among the Allies about the relevance of the 1999 version, or a result of NATO’s inability 
to develop “sufficient consensus for collective action” until faced by an actual crisis.22 
NATO’s military operations in  the 1999 Kosovo conflict marked a turn ing point 
for the Alliance as it was the firs t time that NATO forces had been employed in co mbat 
operations outside its geographic boundaries without a mandate from the United Nations 
Security Council, seem ingly in  contradiction to the UN Char ter and the North Atlantic 
Treaty.  Since then, NATO has undertaken more operations in distant lands.  This chapter 
examines NATO’s vision for future military operations in an expeditionary posture, given 
the rad ical change in g lobal s ecurity concer ns since the most recent S trategic Con cept 
was published in 1999.  The aim is to determine what roles the Alliance’s nascent Special 
Operations Forces (S OF) will be requi red to f ill a s part of  the NATO SOF 
Transformation Initiative (NSTI), given th e dynam ic sec urity environm ent in which 
NATO is currently engaged, and will certainly continue to face in the next decad e and 
beyond.  The overarching strategy docum ents this chapter analyzes are NATO’s 1999 
Strategic Concept, the 2004 Strategic Visi on docum ent, NATO’s M ilitary Concept for  
Defense Against Ter rorism, and NATO’s Comprehensive  Politica l Guidance.  These 
documents provide th e Alliance’s guidance and philosoph y about the em ployment of 
NATO armed forces, and serve as the starting point from which to determine whether the 
Alliance’s vision is appropriate for the next decade’s security challenges.   
B. NATO’S SECURITY VISION 
1. The 1999 Strategic Concept 
The 1999 Strategic Concept builds upon its predecessor and specifies elements of 
NATO’s “broad approach to security” in the twenty-first century, while desc ribing the  
new security environment it faces. 23  The docum ent points to issues such as terrorism , 
                                                 
22 Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis, European Security Institutions: Ready for the Twenty-First 
Century? (Dulles, VA: Brasseys, Inc., 2000), 20. 
23 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO Press Release, Washington Summit, 24 April 1999, par. 
5, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm (accessed 7 September 2008). 
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sabotage and organized crim e, disruption of  the f low o f vita l resources and the  
uncontrolled m ovement of  large num bers of  people as threaten ing to the Allia nce’s 
security interests.24  Additionally, instabili ties in countries peripheral to Allies cau sed by 
“economic, social and political difficulties,” or  “ethnic and religious ri valries, territorial 
disputes, inadequate or faile d effort s at  reform, t he abus e of hum an rights, and the 
dissolution of states” are cited as potential crises which could in some circum stances 
necessitate NATO inter vention.25  In referring to strategy, the NATO Handbook notes 
that the m ost significant security ch allenges that the Alliance faces in  the contemporary 
period are “ethnic con flict, the ab use of hu man rights, p olitical in stability, eco nomic 
fragility, terrorism and the spread of  nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their 
means of  delive ry.”26  The strategic environm ent desc ribed is indeed broad, and the 
breadth m ay bring uncertainty and m isunderstanding, particularly regarding the use of 
force in non-Article 5 (NA5) operations.  Fo r example, NATO’s mission in Afghanistan 
could be ch aracterized as respon sive to a num ber of the security concerns m entioned in 
the Strategic Concept, includi ng terrorism , but none provid es true specificity.  The 
absence of specifics  co uld create points of contention  and confusio n am ong Allies, 
particularly in the event that consen sus must be reach ed in short o rder to avert a m ajor 
crisis. 
In ref erring to f orce po sturing, the docum ent points ou t th at “th e f orces of  the  
Alliance m ust continue  to be adap ted to m eet the require ments of the f ull range  of 
Alliance missions effectively and to  respond to future challenges.” 27  However, nowhere 
in the docum ent is it written th at NATO forces should be postured to conduct 
expeditionary operations, although the docum ent does make the distinction between 
traditional collective defense outlined in Ar ticle 5 of the North A tlantic Treaty and NA5 
                                                 
24 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” par. 24. 
25 Ibid., par. 20. 
26 “The Strategic Concept of the Alliance,” NATO Handbook, Chapter 2: The Transformation of the 
Alliance, NATO Publications Online, 8 October 2002, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0203.htm (accessed 7 September 2008). 
27 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” par. 51. 
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operations in noting that NATO forces m ust be prepared to res pond to both m issions.28  
Jamie Shea, NATO’s Di rector of Policy Planning, suggests that the Alliance will have to 
seriously discuss its future strategic policy with regard to w hat has been called “the new 
Article 5” or “collective defense without borders.”29  This line of reasoning is consistent 
with NATO’s need to decide, in both political and military terms, how involved it should 
be as an  alliance  in e xpeditionary m issions, particularly when som e Allies  f eel that 
specific potential crises  could adversely im pact their nation al security.  As Shea p oints 
out, “defense of populations is now no longer the same thing as defense of territory.”30   
Opinions supporting and opposi ng an update of the Strate gic Concept have been 
widely published in recent years.  Support ha s come most notably from NATO Secretary 
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel.  She notes the 
obvious shortcom ings in having an Alliance strategy that predat es “the terrorist 
challenges we face today.”31  On the opposite side, concer n was expressed in 2005 that a 
new Strategic Concept review could be ill-timed as a result of tensions and disagreements 
among the Allies regarding the legitim ate use of force in the aftermath of the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq. 32  Since then, the political recrimin ations among the Allies that cau sed 
apprehension about undertaking a Strategic C oncept review have abated som ewhat, and 
calls for such an exercise have come more frequently.   
Since the 1 999 Strategic Concept was wr itten, NATO has taken part in m ilitary 
operations outside its geographic boundaries (in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Darfur), in 
military operation s with out a UN Security Council m andate (Kosovo), and in m ilitary 
                                                 
28 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” par. 47. 
29 Jamie Shea, “A NATO for the 21st Century: Toward a New Strategic Concept,” The Fletcher 
Forum of World Affairs, 31, 2 (2007), 53. http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/31-2pdfs/Shea.pdf 
(accessed 29 September 2008). 
30 Ibid., 53. 
31 Angela Merkel, Address at Opening Ceremony of 54th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, 10 November 2008, http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reden/2008/11/2008-11-
10-rede-merkel-dt-atlantische-gesellschaft.html (accessed 20 November 2008). 
32 Pro and con arguments regarding the need to update the Strategic Concept can be found in “Debate: 
Is it Time to Update the Strategic Concept?” NATO Review, Autumn 2005, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/debate.html (accessed 18 November 2008). 
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operations featuring combat a nd state-bu ilding capacity s imultaneously (Afghanistan).  
These operations are ev idence of NATO’s tran sformation toward a m ore flexible and 
agile f orce, and are d emonstrative of  the Alliance ’s cha nging view toward a more 
globally-focused security posture.  In light of this evolution, it stands to reason that the 
Strategic Concept should reflect ho w the A lliance employs its m ilitary forces now, and  
how it plan s to do so  in the f oreseeable future.  The Allies  may decide to comm ission a 
new Strategic Concept review at the Strasbourg-Kehl summit meeting in April 2009. 
2. The Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism 
In the weeks following the 11 Septem ber 2001 attacks on the United States and 
the subsequent invoking of Article 5, Allianc e Defense Ministers ag reed that a strateg y 
must be developed to defend against ter rorism.  As a resu lt, NATO’s military leadership 
developed the Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism  ba sed on existing 
strategic guidance and the Alliance’s terrorism threat assessment.  This document was the 
first in the post-Cold W ar era tha t outline d the potential use of force outside NATO’s 
geographic boundaries “by acting against thes e terrorists and thos e who harbor them.” 33  
The prem ise of preventive or pre-em ptive action con tradicts NATO’s traditional 
collective defense philosophy that had its ge nesis in the Cold W ar and was based upon 
resisting and repelling the i nvading comm unist hordes.  In fact, the Military Concept 
delineates between offensive (counterterro rism—CT) and defensive (anti-terrorism ) 
operations.34  This deline ation is also  a break w ith trad itional European a pproaches to 
terrorism as f alling within the do main of  law enf orcement agenc ies.  However, the 
document stipula tes th at NATO f orces w ill act within  the Allian ce’s geog raphic 
boundaries only if requested to do so, an d that the nation conducting dom estic CT 
maintains primary responsibility. 
As f ar as of fensive m ilitary ope rations agains t terro rists an d their  spon sors ar e 
concerned, the Military Concept categorizes NATO’s involvement as be ing either in the 
                                                 
33 “NATO’s Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism,” NATO International Military Staff, 
October 2003 (updated 14 April 2005), http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm (accessed 9 July 2008). 
34 “NATO’s Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism.” 
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lead or in a supporting role.  The docum ent expresses the Alliance’s first public leaning 
toward the  developm ent of  a  SOF capability  when  it s tates that planning for 
counterterrorism operations recognizes “the need for m ore specialized anti-terrorist 
forces.”35  By and large, general pu rpose military forces are  not tra ined or equippe d to 
engage in these types of operations, though th ere are exceptions to the rule (e.g.,  British 
forces in Northern Ireland).  However, SOF experts David Gompert and Raymond Smith 
write that “generally sp eaking, SOF are m ore useful than regular m ilitary forces  for 
finding and elim inating terrorists” and c ite exam ples of SO F CT operations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines to support their view.36   
In addition  to outlining  the  need f or sp ecialized forces,  th e Military  Concept 
outlines the  need to tak e advantage  of  core capabilities that are inher ent to U.S. SOF, 
such as Psychological Operations and Inform ation Operations in order to m aximize the 
leverage that these capabili ties provide in gain ing the support of local populations.  
Paradoxically, these core capabilities are not co nsidered part of the doctrinal sk ill set for  
NATO SOF under NSTI. 37  The Military Concep t does not s tate where this capab ility 
should reside, nor the means by which it shoul d be em ployed.  The om ission of such a 
vital detail in this and other strategy docum ents appears to be a glaring oversight, but i t 
probably reflects the dif ficulties encountered by  the Allies in reaching consensus on  this 
document.  As experts  on the Alliance have  pointed out,  the Allies have som etimes 
approved vague wording in order to achieve consensus. 
It should also be noted that the Military Concept requires that the decision-making 
process in NATO be “as effective and tim ely as possible” so that  the concept can be 
implemented effectively in situ ations that feature little or no adva nce warning to  “deter 
                                                 
35 “NATO’s Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism.”  
36 David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, “Creating a NATO Special Operations Force,” Defense 
Horizons, 52 (March 2006), 3, http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/defense_horizons/DH_52.pdf (accessed 3 July 
2008). 
37 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, AJP-3.5, Ratification Draft 1” NATO, 2008 
https://nsa.nato.int/protected/unclass/ap/Dr%20AP/AJP-3.5%20RD1.pdf (available with account access 
only; accessed 11 August 2008).  The proposed set of principal tasks for NATO SOF forces is outlined in 
Chapter 2 of this document.  For a complete statement of U.S. SOF tasks, see “Joint Publication 3-05: 
Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,” Department of Defense, The Joint Staff, 17 December 2003, 
Chapter II, Figure II-2, Page II-5. 
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terrorist attacks or to prevent their occurrence.”38  Because NATO’s cu rrent political and 
military structures are built upon a consensus  m odel, success in this  regard m ay be 
scenario-dependent.  The Military Concept concludes by stating that the Allian ce must 
“be prepared to conduct military operations” in its CT role “as and where required” when 
determined by the North Atlantic Council (N AC).39  Such concrete comm itment of 
NATO forc es to a globally-focused strate gy was previously expressed in NAC 
communiqués at the m inisterial m eeting in  Reykjavik in May 2002 and at the summit 
meeting in Prague in November 2002.40 
The Military Concept’s wording implies a need to adopt a more expeditionary and 
proactive po sture with regard to co mbating terrorism  than NATO has practiced at any 
point in the history of the A lliance.  In  practice, such  a posture m ay prove infeasible 
given the p olitical relations am ong Allies and the attitud es toward e xpeditionary CT  
missions.  Moreover, the Allies w ould have to surmount the problem that French scholar 
Guillaume Parm entier has cha racterized as NATO’s political and m ilitary a rms both 
“trying to do the other’s job.” 41  To put it m ore bluntly, in  the absence of an imm ediate 
contingency (such as the 11 Septem ber 2001  attacks or the Madrid and London 
bombings), NATO wi ll continue to suffer decision-making m aladies in com bating 
terrorism which are cau sed by differing views among the Allies about h ow the prob lem 
should be addressed. 
                                                 
38 “NATO’s Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism.” 
39 Ibid. 
40 Statements regarding the employment of NATO forces wherever and whenever necessary can be 
found in the NAC communiqués following the 2002 Reykjavik ministerial meeting 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-059e.htm and the 2002 Prague summit meeting 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm (accessed 4 September 2008). 
41 Dr. Guillaume Parmentier, Comments given at the “Future of Transatlantic Security Relations” 
Conference, captured in The Future of Transatlantic Security Relations: A Colloquium Report, ed. Dr. 
Joseph R. Cerami, Lieutenant General (USA, Ret) Richard A. Chilcoat, Patrick B Baetjer, Strategic Studies 
Institute of the U.S. Army War College, September 2006, 15, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB725.pdf (accessed 2 September 2008). 
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3. The 2004 Strategic Vision Document 
Recent NATO operations far from  hom e have dem onstrated th e Allie s’ 
willingness to act in su pport of co llective security on a global basis.  This is cons istent 
with Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge, a document written in 2004 by General 
James L. Jones, USMC, and Adm iral E.P. Giambastiani, USN, who were then serving as 
SACEUR and Supreme Allied Comm ander-Transformation (SAC-T) respec tively—
NATO’s top military commanders.  Though written to expre ss the views of NATO’s  top 
two m ilitary leaders ra ther than a s a st atement of  Allianc e policy, th e docum ent has 
nevertheless received a great deal o f atten tion in NATO military circles.  The authors  
hold that “the Allianc e will re spond m ilitarily m ore f requently in address ing global 
threats to its intere sts” in a security envi ronment that calls for greater flexibility to  
combat current and future asymmetric challenges. 42  They specifically cite sev eral 
elements of the new se curity envir onment that m ay directly im pact NATO’s m ilitary 
posturing: “globalization, the increasing sophistication of asymmetric warfare, the effects 
of changing dem ography and environm ent, failing states, radical ideolog ies and  
unresolved conflicts.” 43  For the m ost part, these security concerns overlap with those 
cited in  the  Strategic Concept, bu t the docum ent provides a  level of  detail that is more 
specific about the potential that these issues have to spur NATO forces into action. 
The Strategic Vision document is pragmatic about military intervention in a world 
that may see a destabilized security situation with little or no forewarning.  The document 
states that asymmetric  threats “c onstitute the m ost imm ediate security r isk” to the  
Alliance as a result of the ability of a dversaries to develo p unconventional m eans of 
“direct and indirect attack.” 44  The U.S. officers s erving as SACEUR and SAC-T called 
for structural change, noting that forces “m ust be expeditionary in character and design” 
as well as capable of operating in  sm aller numbers and in concurrent and protracted 
                                                 
42 General James L. Jones and Admiral E.P. Giambastiani, “Strategic Vision: The Military 
Challenge,” NATO Defence College Publications, August 2004, 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/sc/stratvis0804.pdf (accessed 7 October 2008), iii. 
43 Ibid., 2. 
44 Ibid., 3-4. 
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operations “at som e distance from hom e bases.” 45  W hile some may poi nt to NATO’s 
ISAF role as an exam ple of a m ore expedi tionary force, Jam ie Shea holds that “The 
major challe nge f or NATO, then, is to determ ine how it wishes to def ine itse lf in the 
future as an organizer and facilitator of expeditionary  m issions beyond its territory.” 46  
But having an expeditionary force is not enough to counter asymmetric threats 
effectively.  The forces m ust have su fficient specialized m anning, training, and 
equipment, which is traditional in SOF, to confront and overcome asymmetric threats. 
From a strategy standpoint, the Strate gic Vision docum ent m akes significant 
strides toward defining  what role NATO’s military forces  should adopt.  It clearly 
outlines the security concerns and destabilizing effects that have become predominant in 
the current era, and  points to  the n eed to maintain the Ar ticle 5 requirem ents of high-
intensity co nflict that dom inated the Cold  War period.  Additionally , the docu ment 
provides greater granularity a bout the security e nvironment through the eyes of the two 
top Alliance military leaders, and points to the need to maintain all the instruments of the 
Alliance’s power—diplom atic, inf ormational, m ilitary and econom ic—as part of an 
integrated s trategy to f ace and ov ercome thes e security c hallenges.  This opinio n is 
echoed in the Atlantic Council’s NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism 
study which outlines the importance of overcoming differences between the United States 
and its Euro pean Allies in de fining the Alliance ’s CT role, specif ically pointing  to th e 
“need to think and act in term s of a long- term strategy combining the whole range of 
policy instruments that are relevant” in combating terrorism.47 
4. Comprehensive Political Guidance 
When the NATO heads of state and governm ent met in Riga in Novem ber 2006, 
they r esolved to estab lish a f ramework f or Alliance p riorities in “ capability iss ues, 
                                                 
45 Jones and Giambastiani, 6. 
46 Shea, 53. 
47 “NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism,” 10. 
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planning disciplines and intelligence.”48  In the str ategic context in which this docum ent 
was written,  NATO leaders agreed  that terror ism and the spread of weapons of m ass 
destruction (W MD) are th e two “prin cipal th reats” the Alliance faces. 49  The 
Comprehensive Political Guidance builds upon many of the ideas cap tured in previous 
strategic documents and goes even  further in s tating a n eed for forces that are flexible,  
expeditionary, and able to rapidly res pond to a variety of security concerns. 50  At the 
same time, the docum ent reaffirms the stra tegy outlined  in  the 1999 Strategic Concept  
and insists upon the consensus decision-making process in determining when to intervene 
militarily, including in  NA5 operations.  Thes e two premises m ay entail a s ignificant 
contradiction which m ust be resolv ed if  the Comprehensive  Political Guidance is to be  
used as a pillar in NATO’s st rategic vision.  Decisions by c onsensus, as far as NATO is 
concerned, are not traditionally known as being rapid or flexible. 
NATO’s history has shown that reaching pol itical consensus can be ch allenging 
under the most favorable circum stances.  The attacks of 11 September 2001 had a 
unifying effect on the Alliance an d led to th e swift invocation of Article 5.  However,  
decisions to  deploy  m ilitary f orces in an expe ditionary f ashion will n ot alway s b e so  
definitive.  Persuading  NATO members to decide to ac t m ay be dif ficult in som e 
contingencies.  As the a lliance enlar ges and the  m issions b ecome less consistent with 
each Ally’s  security strategy and dom estic political enviro nment, there will likely be 
more and more hurdles in reaching consensus.   Operations in the Balkans, Afghani stan 
and Darfur were, by and large, clear cut cas es in which there was little controve rsy 
among the Allies abou t the need to  conduct m ilitary operations, though  there was s harp 
disagreement within th e Allian ce about th e extent an d nature o f the operations.   
Ultimately, consensus was  reached that the  Alliance needed  to  intervene  in  resolving          
                                                 
48 “Comprehensive Political Guidance,” NATO Online Library, 29 November 2006 (updated 5 
November 2007), par. 1, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm (accessed 15 October 2008). 
49 Ibid., par. 2. 
50 Ibid., par. 10. 
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those crises in spite of th e fact that operations were to be conducted outside NATO’s  
geographic boundaries, and in the case of Kosovo, without a UN Security Council 
mandate.   
While not ignoring the lessons offered by NATO’s post-Cold W ar m ilitary 
operations, it is important to understand what the Comprehensive Political Guidance aims 
to achieve.  An exam ination of  the current  politic al guida nce with re spect to m ilitary 
operations helps to determ ine how best to avoid problem s in reaching consensus with 
respect to NATO’s future security environment.  The docum ent offers some detail about 
what is ex pected of  the Alliance  m ilitarily.  There ar e 10 broad -brush capa bility 
requirements meant to prompt significant Alliance transformation across the spectrum of 
conflict, to include operations not previously given great empha sis such as th e ability to  
undertake “com bat, stabilization, recons truction, reconciliatio n and hum anitarian 
activities simultaneously.” 51  This declara tion is the m ost signif icant pub licly-available 
guidance written in the post-Cold War era re garding how the Allies s hould desig n the 
forces that they contrib ute to NATO operations.  The fact th at it exten ds along most of 
the spectrum of conflict is indicative of the realization that NATO must transform to meet 
the challenges of the twenty-first century security environment lest it become irrelevant. 
The Allian ce has im plemented bold tran sformation initiatives to m eet the 
standards o utlined in published s trategy docu ments.  For  exam ple, in 2003 NATO 
adopted a new command structure with strategic scope which is “more flexible and better 
able to dea l with the s ecurity challenges of the 21st Century.” 52  Furth er, th e NATO 
Response Force (NRF) was created as a “robus t rapid reaction capability, deployable and 
sustainable wherever it m ay be required.” 53  These military applications and capabilitie s 
are examined further in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
                                                 
51 “Comprehensive Political Guidance,” par. 16.h. 
52 “The New NATO Force Structure,” NATO International Military Staff, October 2003 (updated 
October 2006), http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/force-structure.htm (accessed 15 October 2008). 
53 “The New NATO Force Structure.” 
 22
C. RED CARDS, CAVEATS, CONSENSUS AND SHORTFALLS 
A nation’s willingness to comm it its m ilitary to combat is largely based on that 
nation’s societal perspective.  Timo Noetzel  and Benja min Schreer have argued that a  
nation’s will to commit military forces to combat is “influenced by its values, culture and 
historical experiences” and th at the willingness to use force to  achieve political goals is  
shaped by a nation’ s strategic culture.54  The Alliance’s 1999 Stra tegic Concept outlines 
the dependence NATO has on “the equita ble sharing of the roles, risks and 
responsibilities” among the Allies for collective defense, im plying that strategic culture 
and values are fundamentally similar within the Alliance. 55  However, while the concept 
of equitable burden-sharing in NATO is idea l in prin ciple, it is im probable in pra ctice, 
regardless of whether the assessment of burden-sharing focuses on economic, military or 
political dim ensions.  To highligh t this discrepancy, in 2007 only six of the 26 Allies  
made the desired investm ent and expenditure s (two percen t of GDP) in  their respe ctive 
military establishments.56  Decisions to commit resources and modernize national arm ed 
forces are made at the national level.  W hen not aligned with NATO expectations, these  
decisions could impact the ability  of the Allia nce as a whole to effectiv ely plan for and 
execute m ilitary op erations.  The f act that so f ew Allies m eet expected r esource 
allocations in their respective militaries indicates that, in practice, there are differences in 
strategic culture and spending priorities at the national level that trump NATO’s strategic 
outlook. 
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Restrictions on a nation’ s military when particip ating in m ultinational operations 
have existed in m odern combat in Europe since World War I, when U.S. General Jo hn 
Pershing ref used to subordinate U.S. com bat troops to French command, having been 
directed by Washington to wait until U.S. co mbat strength was sufficient to engage the 
enemy on its own. 57  The  urgency of the situation s oon changed Pershing’s perception; 
and Am erican forces u ltimately served unde r European comm anders.  However, the 
event seems to have resonated through the remainder of the twentieth century and into the 
current period.  Twenty-first century NATO is no different in this regard.   
Even in cases in which consensus is reached to  employ NATO forces, m ilitary 
commanders leading the effort m ay find them selves subject to “red card s” and cave ats 
that will sty mie m ission accom plishment.  Each  Ally h as the righ t to restrict how  its  
forces are e mployed.  This m ay create sign ificant problems for military commanders in 
meeting both the standards of employm ent a nd the expectations established in the 
Alliance’s strategy documents.  Limitations or e xclusions based on the nationa l political 
concerns of Alliance members must be given great forethought if NATO is to  effectively 
employ military forces in an expeditionary m anner, particularly in crisis operations when 
time is of the essence and there may be little or no advance warning.   
The Kosovo cam paign brought this possibility  to reality in the starkest possible 
terms when British  Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson refused to comply with the  
orders of the then-SACEUR, U.S. General W esley Clark.  Clark ordered Jackson to 
deploy forces in response to Russian m ovements to control the airport at Pristina, 
Kosovo.  The disagreem ent between the two m ilitary leaders was elevated to Am erican 
and British political c ircles.  This re sulted in Britain ref using to employ its f orces in the 
manner ordered by Clark. 58  Som e observers have pointed to this even t as “evidence of 
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an em erging polarization within the Alliance.” 59  Regardless of the individual 
personalities, objectives and perceptions of those involved in the Pristina affair, the 
essential significance of the event is that Allies h ave on occasion refused to employ their 
forces in ac cordance with SACEUR/Allied  Comm and Operations o rders at the  tac tical 
level; and this has ref lected politic al disagr eements at m inisterial lev els.  This is the 
antithesis of the desired relationships in the Alliance. 
NATO’s deployment to Afghanistan offers additional exam ples of how an Ally’s 
political ph ilosophy has  a direct impact on th e m ilitary leadership’s  em ployment of 
assigned f orces a t the  tactic al leve l.  There  are  Allie s th at, f or reaso ns all the ir o wn, 
participate in the NATO-led Internationa l Security A ssistance F orce (ISAF) in  
Afghanistan, but with strict limitations on the ro le their deployed troops are  allowed to 
fulfill.  As  an exam ple, German forces are limited in their use of  force in the  “targeted 
killing of insurgents” unless the Germ an so ldiers have been at tacked by those sam e 
insurgents.60  Restrictions were even placed on Ge rman SOF operating outside the ISA F 
mandate along side m ultinational SOF under th e U.S.-led Operati on Enduring Freedom 
(OEF).  These res trictions precluded the Ge rman SOF from  firing on legitim ate targets 
unless they were fired upon first.61  According to Noetzel and Schreer, the German policy 
in Afghanis tan “underm ines Ger many’s m ilitary credibility am ong allied partners  and 
restrains Germ any’s ability to m ake f ull use of m ilitary power as a n instr ument of  
policy.”62 
But the Germ ans are not alone in th is approach to their contribution to Allianc e 
operations.  Colonel Ian Hope notes in hi s monograph th at Allies “h ave placed heavy 
caveats upon their forces to pro tect them from being sucked  into OEF m issions that are 
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directed unilaterally by the W hite H ouse and CENTCOM  with no alliance input.” 63  
Politically-motivated decisions based on public  opinion in m ember nations and bilateral 
disagreements have pro ven problem atic for NATO in conducting m ilitary operations 
since 1992, though the ISAF experience is prov ing far m ore costly than did Kosovo—
both politically and militarily.   
In addition to “red cards” and caveats that may be placed on an Ally’s forces once 
deployed to an operation, displeasure has b een expressed regarding the NATO consensus 
decision-making model previously discussed.  This thesis noted in Chapter I that General 
Jones has characterized  NATO’s decision -making process as “slow and painful” and 
burdened by political constraints. 64  Both the Military Co ncept f or Def ense Against 
Terrorism and the 2004 Strategic Vision doc ument note that NATO must be able to  
shorten the tim e necessary to dec ide that a military response is required to address a 
security risk.  These docum ents may be regarded  as calls to action f or NATO’s politica l 
leadership.  To protect the Alliance’s security interests, the Allies need to develop a better 
process by which they  can agree o n committing to the use of military forces in res ponse 
to a security concern wherever it may be. 
There are also limitations in m ember nations’ SOF and general pu rpose military 
capabilities that must be considered in the pl anning process, particular ly as it pe rtains to 
burden-sharing.  These capabilities are discussed in Chapter IV. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In 2005, Jean Dufour cq, then the Chief of the NATO De fense College’s 
Academic Research Branch, wrote that “no strategy can  be really e ffective unless it 
identifies priorities and f ocuses efforts and, hence, provides the ap propriate control over 
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the means available for achieving the specific aim.”65  While the four strategy documents 
examined in this  chap ter attem pt to ou tline NATO’s prior ities, th e ef forts a re not 
accomplished uniform ly and do not elim inate am biguity in focusing the Allianc e’s 
prioritization of its tasks.  Despite the significant transformation initiatives in the absence 
of specific strategic guidance, there rem ain chasm s between political philosophies and 
military app lications within the Alliance tha t se rve to ham string ef fectiveness on b oth 
fronts.  For exam ple, each of the four strategic docum ents touched upon in this ch apter 
argues that terrorism is a major threat to the Alliance, but there is no pragm atic guidance 
as to how the Alliance should app roach the p roblem; and this m ay directly im pact 
NATO’s ability to dea l with it.  In point of  fact, in the Strategic Concep t, which sho uld 
arguably be the capstone and prevailing guida nce, the word terrorism  appears exactly  
once, and is m entioned in the sam e breath with  organized crime.  There is also only one 
reference to terrorist attacks, as the docum ent notes that the Alliance m ust protect forces 
and infrastructure from  them .  Chapter III of this thes is disc usses linkages between 
terrorism and crim inal activ ity, but the two phenom ena ar e nonetheless distinct and 
should be addressed as such.   
The 1999 Strategic Concept is of less value than a revised version could be, given 
the asymmetric nature o f the curren t secur ity environment, and in ligh t of  the gro wing 
emphasis that subsequent strategy docum ents have placed on combating terrorism  
wherever it may exist.  In his opinion about  modernizing the Strategic Concept, a NATO 
Defense College Research Fellow, Slovak Co lonel Pavel Necas, notes that it “should 
become a strategy-centered document that provides practical and pr ioritized guidance for 
Alliance m embers” to  o perate in  an  era  of  asy mmetric th reats.  As e ach yea r pa sses 
without an updated Strategic Concept, this  opinion will be voiced more and more 
frequently.66 
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It has been argued that European philo sophies on how to com bat terrorism  are 
less proactive than the Am erican approach. 67  Europeans place greater em phasis on 
distinctions among types of terroris m (e.g., po litical, nationalistic or religious) and their 
respective causes, with different approach es in confronting them .  These nuanced 
differences manifest themselves in NATO’s political decision-making process.  This has  
an effect on Alliance military operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels as 
these d ifferences am ong m ilitary f orces reflec t their natio nal outlook s.  An Atlantic 
Council analysis of the threat of terrorism  and its relationship to NATO’s approach 
claims that terrorism ’s highly adaptive nature  “requires frequent adjustm ents in ways of 
thinking and responding.”68  At the political level this has not happened.  However, when 
taken together, the four strategy docum ents pr ovide greater insight as to the security  
issues that NATO leaders judge should rece ive greatest attention.  However, such 
nebulous and ambiguous guidance s pread widely over four docum ents will not pro vide 
the explicit guidance needed to develop requ isite c apabilities to m eet the challen ges 
deemed greatest. 
The liter ature regard ing NATO transf ormation in the post-Cold W ar world is  
extensive, and opinions vary about the Allian ce’s relevan ce in the c urrent secu rity 
environment.  Noting NATO’s evolution in th e post-Soviet era, Daniel Fried, the U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, recently characterized the 
Alliance’s transformation to a m ore globally po stured organization.  He testified befor e 
the House Foreign Affairs Comm ittee regardin g “NATO' s transform ation from  a static 
Cold W ar instrum ent that never f ired a shot in anger to an active, ex peditionary f orce 
capable of projecting p ower out of area where needed.” 69  The success  NATO has  
enjoyed in this regard seem s to have been  achieved without the benefit of publicly 
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circulated comprehensive strategic guidance do cuments that pr ioritize security concerns 
and direct the development of capabilities to confront them. 
Notwithstanding the ob vious lim itations in  N ATO’s strategic vision, there is 
evidence that the Alliance is taking steps to  deal with asymmetric  threats through the  
NSTI.  Terrorism  and related asymm etric thre ats are the g reatest secu rity con cerns in  
three of the four guidance doc uments considered.  Given th at SOF prov ide the greatest 
potential to overcome and counter these threats,  the NSTI is a logical and necessary step 
for the Alliance to m eet CT expectations .  The 2009 NATO m ission set is characterized  
by operating environm ents in which asymm etry has often been the prevalent m ode of 
operation employed by the adversary, no wher e m ore so than in Afghanistan.  The 
success SOF enjoyed at the onset of the war in  Afghanistan in 2001 is often pointed to as  
the latest exam ple of modern warfare.  High intens ity co nflict waged by two heavily 
armed adversaries was expected to occur in the Fulda Gap had the Cold War gone hot.   
However, as the 2004 S trategic Vision doc ument, NATO’s Military Concept for 
Defense Against Te rrorism, and NATO’s Comprehensive  Political G uidance a ll note,  
terrorism and asymmetric warfare are the most likely concerns that the Alliance will have 
to face, and the high in tensity combat th at NATO envisaged during the Cold War is  
improbable.  W ith that in m ind, the advent of the NSTI is m ore critical than ever,  
assuming that the lim itations b rought into play by red cards, caveats and consensus 
decision-making do not render NA TO SOF incap able of  r ealizing the  stra tegic ef fects 
expected by the Alliance’s political and military arms when properly employed.70  
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III. NATO THREAT PERCEPTIONS: EXAMINING THE 
ALLIANCE’S CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS 
A. OVERVIEW 
An attempt to determine what NATO perceives as threatening is difficult because 
the Alliance’s Threat Assessm ent is classifi ed and not publicly available.  However, a 
general assessment can be m ade based on pub lished documents and a n analysis of the 
greater geo strategic security environm ent.  As m entioned in the previous chapter, 
NATO’s strategy has evolved to deal with changing security ch allenges, though the 
public strategic documents are les s explic it in  prioritizing threats th an might have been 
expected.  The 1999 Strategic Concept is broad enough to encom pass every potential 
threat, inc luding f ull-scale high -intensity a ggression against the Alliance.  As noted in 
Chapter II, the Strategic Vision written by NATO’s top m ilitary commanders points to 
asymmetric threats as requiring immediate atte ntion.  In fact, each of the four strategy 
documents analyzed in  the previo us chapte r notes the p otential th reat f rom either  
terrorism or asymmetric threa ts, or a combination of the two.  Obvi ously, terrorism must 
be considered one of the most significant thr eats that the Alliance will be faced with, and 
counterterrorism (CT) operations should be at the forefront of NATO force posturing. 
The previo us chapter argued th at, in  spite of significant post-Cold W ar 
transformation in NATO, there is still a need for greater strategic vision to ensure that the 
Alliance’s m ilitary cap abilities are  properly p ostured to c onfront 21st century thr eats.  
The Military Concept for Defense Agains t Terrorism  notes th at “counterterrorism 
operations will be m ainly join t operations and som e units spec ifically tra ined in 
counterterrorist operations m ight be extrem ely effective.” 71  The previou s chapter also 
mentioned that Special Operations  Forces (SOF) are m uch more qualified than regular 
conventional forces or law enforcement personnel to conduct CT operations. 
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This chapter examines current and f uture threats facing the Alliance bas ed on the 
global security environm ent and those threats deem ed mo st significant in publicly 
available NATO strateg y documents.  This chapter then an alyzes what potential NATO 
has to confront these threats. 
B. NATO’S 21ST CENTURY THREATS 
Although NATO published a threat assessment that was agreed upon by all Allies, 
much has been written about what truly constitutes a threat.  What the Baltic States  deem 
most threatening differs from  the outlook of older Allies with a different history and 
geostrategic situation, such as Britain.  Karl-Heinz Ka mp notes the differences in 
perception b etween “old ” and “new ” Allie s in  writing that “m ost of  NATO’s W estern 
European mem bers have alm ost ex cluded the possibility of  a m ilitary thre at to their  
territorial integrity from their strategic reasoning,” but that “m ost East European 
members emphasize the relevance of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as an assurance 
against an immediate milita ry threat fro m abroad.”72  The obvious reference to grow ing 
intimidation f rom Russia does not detrac t f rom NATO’s overall perceived threats, but  
highlights the differences in judg ment a mong the Allies about what constitu tes the 
greatest threat to individual Allies.   
In October 2002, then-Secretary General Lo rd Robertson attem pted to predict 
what the strategic environm ent would be like in 2015.  He m ade note of five major 
security challenges that the Alliance would face: more instability from volatile areas such 
as the Caucasus, Central Asia, Northern Africa  and the Middle East; spillover as a result 
of the instability, in the fo rm of m igration, human smuggling, and the crim inal activity 
associated with it; ter rorism in all its f orms; failed and failing states; and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.73  Much of Lord Robertson’s prediction is contained in the 
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four strategy documents discussed in the prev ious chapter, and m any of his concerns are 
not mutually exclusive and go hand in glove with  one another.  However, there is little 
argument that the four genera l threats outlined  below have the poten tial to affect each 
Ally individually, and the Alliance as a whole. 
1. Terrorism and Asymmetric Threats 
Terrorism is one of myriad asymmetric threats.  An asymmetric threat is generally 
viewed as one in which weaknes ses are ex posed and exploited by an adversary to 
compensate for the adversary’s relative wea kness in conventional warfare capabilities.  
Much m ore atten tion has been d rawn to it since the end of the Cold W ar, and 
significantly so as a result of Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks.  Paul Thomsen notes that “policy 
makers and journalists alike have called this  ‘a new kind of war,’ but the nineteen box 
cutter-wielding 9/11 hijackers were practicing a very old form  of war in a very new way  
with great intrepidity.”74  This unconventional approach to  warfare has existed as long as 
warfare itself and has b een used to  weaken governments, alliances and  states alike.   In  
characterizing the s trategic impact of asymm etric warfare, a Jane’s Intelligence Review 
report notes that there are psychological and physical effects that work “to explo it the 
fears of the civilian population to w eaken support for the democratic process, underm ine 
the governm ent, or comprom ise it s alliances and partnerships.” 75  Asymm etric threa ts, 
including terrorism, have the potential to do all this sim ultaneously.  In f act, many have 
argued th at the 2004  Madrid  b ombings su ccessfully altered th e Spanish political 
landscape by ushering in a new governm ent which prom ptly rem oved Spanish forces 
from the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. 
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The Militar y Concept docum ent notes tha t re ligious extre mism constitutes th e 
“most immediate terrorist threat” to NATO.76  While Islam is not specifically mentioned, 
there is concern in several European countries  that the growth of the Muslim  population 
in “Old Europe” could have a de stabilizing effect on e xisting an d historical social, 
economic, cultural and political traditions.  While m ost Muslim s in Europe, be they 
immigrants or native-born, are considered moderate, the visibility that Islamic extremists 
are receiving in light of the Madrid a nd London terror attacks; arrests by police of 
extremists and discovery of Al-Qaeda cells in such countries as Belgium, Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands; and even ts such as the Theo  Van Gogh m urder in 
Amsterdam have raised anxiety in tradition al European societies about th e extent of the 
Islamic extremist danger. 
Radical Islam ic ideology is som ething that now transcends m any ethnic and 
cultural differences am ong gr oups insi de and outside Europe.  Modern 
telecommunications and Internet technologi es present extrem ely secure m eans through 
which jihadists can plan operati ons and tap into pools of potenti al recruits.  In fact, the 
U.S. National Intelligence Estimate for Terrorism notes that “the jihad ists regard Europe 
as an im portant venue for at tacking W estern interes ts. Extrem ist ne tworks ins ide the  
extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban attacks, 
as illustrated by the 2004 Ma drid and 2005 London bom bings.”77  Despite the high level 
of concern about jihadists, sta tistics dem onstrate th at terrorist attack s at the hands of 
Islamic radicals occur less frequently than acts conducted by separa tist groups by a wide 
margin.  In fact, Europol data show that 532 incidents of se paratist terrorism occurred in 
Europe in 2007, while only four incide nts can be attributed to Islam ism.78  The same 
report notes that roughly 20% of those arrested in 2007 fo r terrorism -related offenses  
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were Islamists, while more than half were separatists.  However, of 449 convictions for 
terrorism in 2007, 198 were Islamists and 214 were separatists.79   
Whatever the motivation of terrorists in Europe,  the f act of the m atter is that the  
magnitude of terrorism in the name of Islam distresses the population, leaving them  with 
images and fears that they sim ply cannot ignore.  Despite the horror of these acts, 
differences remain among the Allie s in how th ey view terro rism.  Joanne W right of the 
University of Sussex notes that Europeans generally do not share the U.S. conception of a 
“war on terror” and that some Allies may have shortcomings in dealing with the  linkages 
between internal and ex ternal security.80  In developing a strate gy to confront terrorism, 
and the myriad issues such as transnational crime that are associated with it, internal and 
external security cannot be assessed in a vacuum independent of one another. 
2. Instability Domestically and Peripherally 
In his remarks to the U.S. Senate Subc ommittee on European Affairs on the topic 
of Islamic extremism in Europe, Assistan t Secretary of State for Europe an and Eurasian 
Affairs Daniel Fried noted that the e xtremist problem comes from a “minuscule minority 
of Muslim s who seek to distort Islam  for radical and destructive political ends, and 
thereby defile a noble faith by co mmitting terrorist acts. ”81  Fried echoed popular  
sociological explanatio ns for the attracti on m any disaffected native-born European 
Muslims and imm igrants have to extrem ist ideology, citing factors such as 
“demographics; high rates of poverty and unemployment; anti-Muslim  discrim ination 
and racism; a strict adherence by m any Muslims to the language and traditions of their 
countries of origin; an d issues of identity.” 82  Alison Pargeter notes that Islamist 
                                                 
79 “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TESAT) 2008,” Figures 3 and 6, 11. 
80 Joanne Wright, “The Importance of Europe in the Global Campaign Against Terrorism,” Terrorism 
and Political Violence, 18, 2 (2006), 282. 
81 Daniel Fried, “Islamist Extremism in Europe,” Remarks at the Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
European Affairs of t he C ommittee on Fo reign R elations, U nited S tates Senat e, One Hundred Ni nth 
Congress, 5 April 2006 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2007), 3. 
82 Ibid., 4. 
 34
organizations recognized the a lienation tha t many in the  Muslim community in  Europe 
were f eeling and were able to “c hannel this  into a new Islam ic awareness” which 
supported their radical ideology. 83  She asserts that this new Islam ist awareness was  
further catalyzed by radicals fleeing persecu tion in their homelands and large inflows of 
money from Islamist organizations in the Mi ddle East to create “a m elting pot of Islamic 
ideas, ideologies and activism ” in Europe. 84  Visibly, the networked nature of the 
extremist element has the potential to conduct terrorist attacks in NATO countries and in 
regions peripheral to the Allies. 
Since the Madrid and London bombings brought hom e the threat of jihadist 
terrorism to  Europeans,  laws h ave been es tablished to  cur b Islam ic extrem ism in th e 
name of national s ecurity.  In th e eyes of at least som e Muslim s, thes e m easures are 
motivated b y racism  and they ar e increas ing Muslim  animosities to ward nation al law  
enforcement agencies and security  serv ices.  Attem pts to res trict a ctivities dee med 
contributing to radicalism  have not brought the exact results inte nded.  Legislation 
designed to bring Mu slim minorities into the majority fold have of ten been blanket laws 
that neg atively af fect Muslim s acr oss the  boa rd and seem  to focus o n certain ou tward 
differences such as m osques, shops and re staurants serving Islam ic custom ers, and 
Muslim dress and appearance traditions.  This  only serves to exacerba te the “us versus 
them” sentiment and increase s vola tility among the various Muslim  mi nority diasporas 
domestically.85 
Actually, d omestic ins tability can  be cau sed by any n umber of  political,  
economic, a nd social is sues.  The Alliance’s 1 999 Strategic Concept points to a large 
number of potential sources of instability.  Lord Robertson’s assessment of future threats 
to the Alliance com plements the Strategi c Concept and highlights a variety of 
destabilizing factors as well.  The lessons of  the Balkan conflicts through the 1990s were 
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apparently not f orgotten by the au thors of  th e docum ent, given the  in stability tha t th e 
NATO countries nearest the c onflict experienced.  A Dutc h university study notes that 
700,000 refugees fled to W estern European countries in 1989-1994, and that another 4.3 
million people were displaced within the borders of the former Yugoslavia.86   
The im plosion of Yugoslavia in the 1990s  is an example of  instability in 
peripheral regions causing inst ability in NATO nations.  T he hundreds of thousands of 
refugees needed to be cared for, and this put economic and social strains on the countries 
that harbored them .  It is no coincidence that the Balkan  crise s pro mpted the f irst 
engagement by NATO forces outside the Alliance’s territory in a non-Article 5 operation.  
This is an exam ple of what John Deni calls a “new security  landscape” which is 
characterized by “nationalist, ethnic, a nd religious conflicts and unconventional, 
transnational threats”87 and which rapidly became NATO’s most pressing concern. 
It is well docum ented that terrorist groups, regardless of ideology or m otivation, 
have turned  toward crim inal activity to finance their terro r cam paigns.  This has been 
called the “m ost dramatic threat to natio nal and regio nal secu rity,” because the 
relationships among the illicit drug trade, orga nized crime, insurgency, and terrorism  are 
becoming “ increasingly intim ate.”88  A 2006 NATO Parliam entary As sembly report 
underlined the difficulties in fighting opium  production in Afghanistan while European 
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symbiotic relationships between terrorism  and crim e have been characterized  as 
“strategic crim e” because they enco mpass “t he full spectru m” of illegal tran snational 
threats.90   
Because th ese groups are vastly  networ ked, th e solu tions to the prob lem are  
difficult to identify.  As W right notes, “w hen one takes into account the m any other 
existing problems and demographic trends in the Mediterranean region, the Europeans do 
have much to worry about.” 91  These phenom ena have been described as a hydra, with 
each of the heads representing a different transnational threat.  To cut one of the heads off 
does not slay the beast, nor does it elim inate that threat.  The hydra seem s to grow 
another head and continues to brin g greater instability than those thre ats that exist only 
within an Ally’s geographic boundaries. 
3. A New Cold War?  The Russian Dilemma 
NATO’s relationship with Russia h as suffered greatly in recent m onths, reaching 
an exceptionally low point in the wake of the August 2008 Russia-G eorgia war.  The  
Allies suspended the activities and d iscussions of the NATO-Russia Cou ncil (NRC) and  
the NATO Secretary General declared that th ere could be no “business as usual” in 
NATO-Russia relations. 92  Had Georgia been a m ember of NATO, that conflict would 
have forced  the Allian ce to invoke Article 5 and defend Georgia.  In  crafting modern 
strategy, N ATO holds that the likelihood of hi gh intensity conflict pi tting east versus 
west on the European landm ass is unlikely.  K amp notes that NATO must provide “a  
realistic assessment of t he present situation” in the re lationship between the two sid es.93  
He opines that NATO m ust unde rstand the difference “between leg itimate Russian  
security in terests and ca lculating po litical arguments” and be able to see through the 
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rhetoric in assessing what m ay cause Russia to act aggres sively.94  In the eyes of the 
Russians, N ATO enlargem ent affects their le gitimate secur ity in terests, and it m ight 
cause Russia to react as aggressively as in the August 2008 conflict with Georgia. 
Additionally, initiatives  such as  th e U.S. prop osal to  dep loy ballis tic m issile 
defense system ele ments in Poland and Czech Republic are viewed by Russians with  
great skepticism.  Am erican efforts to ease th eir concerns have thus  far not  satisfied the 
Kremlin.  It has been opined that, when  vie wed through the Russian lens, NATO 
enlargement is p art of America’s o verall s trategy to “contain Russia.” 95  The Russian 
response has been anything but meek, as Putin announced in July 2007 that Russia would 
suspend compliance with the Conv entional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty .  This 
suspension took effect on 12 Decem ber 2007.  The Study on NATO Enlargement 
acknowledges that there is no legal li nkage between the CFE Treaty and N ATO 
enlargement, but points to preservation of  the treaty ’s integrity as an issue of 
“fundamental im portance” because it is con sidered “th e cornersto ne of European 
security.”96   
NATO enlargement is not generally viewed  as threatening or provocative in the 
Alliance as a whole, but there has b een concern among some Allies that, if not executed 
properly, enlargem ent could escalate tensions with Russia to a precarious point.  In a 
recent BBC interview, Czech Republic sh adow Foreign Minister Lu bomir Zaoralek 
expressed general relief regarding his country’s membership in NATO but acknowledged 
Russian sensitivities: “Russia is not so strong to be a real enemy for us, but we can make 
it an enem y.  It is our decision. ”97  Warnings about the per ceived threat to Russia by 
NATO enlargement are echoed in other publicati ons as well.  One scholar characterized 
the situation by writing, “Som e observers in  NATO countries are nonetheless concerned 
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that, pa rticularly if  it is  not handle d adro itly, the enlarg ement of  the Allianc e c ould 
instead lead  to confrontati on and polarization.  They wa rn that the Russians might 
conclude they are being  threatened and hum iliated and try to reasse rt control over some 
former Soviet republics or take other retaliatory measures.”98   
As for Russia, there is obvious concern about NATO’s eastward path.  There have 
been not-so-quietly asked questions about th e need for NATO enlargement, m ostly from 
Moscow, but som e concern has bee n expressed by Alliance  members themselves.  The 
most stinging criticism , though, came from  then-President Putin during a speech at the 
2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy when  he stated that pl acing troops nearer 
and nearer Russian borders does not contribut e to European security,  but is actu ally a 
“serious pro vocation tha t redu ces th e leve l of  mutual trust.” 99  Obviously, there is no 
ambiguity in the Russian attitude and “hostility to NATO enlargement.”100   
The perceiv ed threat to  security is far greater am ong the new NATO m ember 
nations that were once part of  the Soviet Un ion or the W arsaw Pact.  These Allie s have 
asked for assurances f rom NATO that they w ill be protected  from Russian aggression if 
they are attacked.  General John Craddoc k, SACEUR, initiated talk s about defense 
planning for such a contingency, but he does not have the authority to develop form al 
defense plans without a threat assessm ent that is “approved by NATO’s political 
leadership.”101  Clearly, there is some anxiety among the Allies about Russian intention s 
in spite of the general acknowledgm ent in  the  1999 Strategic Concept that East-W est 
high intensity conflict is unlikely. 
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4. Energy Security 
In recent y ears, W estern Europe has suffered the disru ption of hydrocarbon  
shipments (most notably natural gas) from  Russian-owned pipelines as a result of 
disagreements that Russia has had with count ries in its “near-abroad” through which the 
pipelines pass.  As energy producers realize the power th at they wield over their 
customers, there is a ris k that the d elivery of hydrocarbons will be us ed as leverage with 
greater freq uency to in crease influ ence politically. 102  Gazprom , Russia’s state-own ed 
natural gas com pany, earns nearly 70% of its incom e from  sales to the European 
Union.103  Likewise, the European Union currently im ports half of its energy 
requirement, and m uch of that com es from  Russia, a dependence exp ected to g row to 
70% by 2030, with 40% of the total natural gas dem and im ported from  Russ ia.104  
Potentially more frightening is the fact that Europe will have to import 94% of its oil and 
84% of its natural gas by 2030.105   
This dependence is unnerving for Eur opeans.  A recent EU Commission on 
Energy report stated, “while the economic impact of Europe’s reliance on energy imports 
may be cause for concern, the security consequences could be dire.” 106  In fact, Andrew  
Monaghan of the NATO Defense College recently noted that energy security is so tightly 
connected to a country’s national security that  any threats to the availability of energy 
resources “m ay lead to war to seize or defend” them .107  Monaghan cited other noted 
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scholars who contend that the “possibility that access to energy resources may become an 
object of large-scale arm ed struggle is alm ost incontestably the single m ost alarm ing 
prospect facing the international system today.”108 
These considerations certainly are in th e minds of NATO le aders and are forcing 
them to pay m uch closer attention to the Alliance’s po tential ro le in providing energy 
security.  In a recent speech, NATO Secret ary General de Hoop Scheffer said that 
NATO’s primary role with regard to energy security is “to police and protect.”109  Much 
of this concern stems from the fact that the Eu ropean Allies have a great dependence on 
imported energy, which is growing quickly, coup led with the fact th at energy-producing 
countries tend to be unstable or politically fragile and to base m ost of their econom ic 
policy on petrodollars.  Putin noted  in 2003 th at “Gazprom is a ‘powerful political and 
economic lever of influence over the rest of the world’.” 110  If th is attitude b ecame 
pervasive throughout unstable pe troleum-producing states and if these states chose to 
manipulate the flow of e nergy, there would be  direct effects on NATO m embers at the 
economic and political levels.   
European Allies understand the predicam ent brought on by disruption s to the 
supply of energy.  As Russia and Ukraine disputed payments for natural gas deliveries 
from the for mer to the latter in Decem ber 2005 and January 2009, and the flow of gas  
subsequently was interrupted, m any highl y-dependent W estern and East-Central 
European countries felt the im pact immediately.  This reality has forced a shuffling of 
priorities to a certain  extent.  U.S. Senator Richard Lugar proposed at the 2006 Riga 
Summit that energy security be viewed as an Article 5 issue, and approached as a m utual 
security con cern.111  In fact, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution unanimously which 
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called upon NATO to “protect the en ergy security of its m embers.”112  Ira Ga ribaldi 
asserts that the issue is gaining in im portance.  In his view, “neglecting to ensure 
European energy security could be lethal to NATO’s unity because it could split the 
alliance between vulnerable and nonvulnerable members.”113 
Clearly, the  threat to NATO’s security that a disruption in energy would cause 
could be devastating to the Allies most hi ghly dependent on energy im ports.  European 
leaders have recognized this ri sk and have worked to diversify sources of  oil and gas so 
that disruption from one source does not cripple or strain them.  However, in spite of calls 
to develop a  strategy to m itigate the threat, NATO has thus  far proceed ed cautiously in 
order to en sure th at solutions to th is pr oblem are app ropriate f or the Alliance  on  the 
whole. 
C. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In 1990, near the end of the Cold War, a strategic analysis called the W ittmann 
Paper was written.  In it, the first glimpse of the twenty-first century security environment 
was captured as NATO was advised “to turn its  attention to m ore unpredictable threats 
such as ethnic strife, religious fundamentalism, and terrorism” and to pay less attention to 
Soviet m ilitary capab ility.  The docum ent also  outlined th e need f or forces th at were 
flexible and  agile. 114  Over the next 1 8 years,  NATO was given opportun ities to  bring 
Wittmann’s vision to fruition during conflicts  in the B alkans and  (sinc e 200 2) in 
Afghanistan.  The Alliance has slo wly adapted and begun transform ing itself m ilitarily 
into an organization that can confront present day threats.  As Kamp observes, “NATO is 
not fighting  agains t a s tate bu t against an  insu rgency” in Afghanistan. 115  One must 
wonder if the Allian ce is pos tured to bring appropriate m ilitary cap ability to  b ear in  
confronting the th reats outlined in this chapter wherever and whenever the Allies d eem 
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appropriate.  The next chapter exam ines Allied capabilities in SOF and conventional 
forces, as well as law enforcement counterterrorism forces. 
The overview of threats in this thesis is by no means comprehensive and does not 
have the benef it of intelligence co llection and analysis that NATO enjoys in prepar ing a 
fully informed threa t assessment.  Rather, th is summary of prospective threats is based 
upon what NATO has alluded to as threatenin g in publicly available strategy docum ents, 
combined with a re asonable c onsideration of  the Alliance ’s most signif icant 
vulnerabilities.  However, of the threats noted, terrorism must be considered the greatest 
near-term threat to th e NATO Allies beca use of its potentially catas trophic and 
destabilizing effects.  It requires great vigilance to defend against, and terrorist 
organizations have ties to transnational groups in Europe that are networked with radicals 
outside Europe.  Terrorist groups have ties to  criminal organizations that sm uggle drugs, 
weapons, people, and other contraband.  Te rrorists m ay target a country’s population 
with destabilizing effect.   
It is in the  counter-terrorist area that the NATO SOF Tra nsformation Initiative 
(NSTI) may have greatest impact.  According to  Karl-Heinz Kamp, “the Alliance is  seen 
as an institution to export stability, to prevent and to manage crises or to take on military 
threats far beyond NATO’s borders.”116  It has further been noted that “NATO’s outreach 
activities to  its par tners” m ay im prove capacity  in weaker states to  th e benef it of  the 
international community.117  The ability of the SOF community to engage ab road toward 
this end is well documented, and the specifi c capabilities are addr essed in the next 
chapter. 
The cum ulative effects of 9/11, Madrid  and L ondon (to say nothing of other  
terrorist attacks) have brought the threat of terrorism  to much greater prominence than it 
had previously.  W hile m any European nations  had, and continue to have, separatist 
groups that terrorize their populations, the new horizontally-networked brand of religious 
extremist te rror u sed b y Al-Qaeda  and its  f ranchises serv ed as a wak e-up call for the 
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Allies to adopt measures to confront it.  However, disagreements among the Allies about  
how to take action are not unusual.   Som e Allies, includ ing the United States, favor a 
proactive approach, whereas others prefer a more reactive approach.   
Terrorist acts have consisted of conventi onal explosive attacks for the m ost part, 
although th ere should be little dou bt that extremist groups would e mploy weapons of 
mass destruction if they coul d obtain them.  Suicide bom bings and improvised explosive 
devices have proven to be lethal, effective, in expensive, easy to use, and difficult to stop.  
Aum Shinrikyo’s m ore com plex and labor-int ensive sarin attack in Tokyo was an 
exception to  these common practices, but th is exception was not based on a lack of 
motivation to acquire and use weapons of m ass destruction, but rather on factors such as 
technical e xpertise, co st, and  m aterial ava ilability.118  If Al-Qaeda had a nuclear 
explosive device or a radiological weapon or any other weapon of m ass destruction, 
however crude it might be, there can be little doubt about its willingness to use it. 
The Alliance is corre ct in noting th e potential destabiliz ing forces of  conf lict in 
peripheral r egions.  NATO’s experience in the Balkans was eye-opening f or Allies on 
both sides o f the Atlantic.  Allied inabili ty or unwillingness to commit com bat forces  
compelled the United S tates to provide the va st majority of troops, equipm ent, aircraft 
sorties and munitions in efforts to bring stability to Bosnia and Kosovo.  As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the instability and hu man rights concerns, as well as the spillover  
effect of refugees into NATO Europe, created an environment in which the Allies ag reed 
that something needed to be done, but then could not easily reach a consensus about what 
to do.  According to John Deni, the United St ates was also forced “to bring into the 
theater the necessary s pecial op erations for ces” in additio n to the co nventional f orces 
committed to the Balk an cris es, be cause th ere was little c apability res ident in NATO 
Europe at the time.119 
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Further instability from st rategic crim e which transce nds national boundaries is 
also a serious threat, but step s have been taken to address it.  Recognizing that the drug 
trade has become the primary funding source for terrorist groups and extrem ists and that 
a m ajor source of drugs lies on its southern  border, the  Collectiv e Security T reaty 
Organization, the Russian-led secu rity or ganization, has launche d an initiative th rough 
the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)  to help pursue counter-narcotics operations in Central 
Asia in an attempt to mitigate any spillover effect from Afghanistan.120  However, Jane’s 
Intelligence Review notes that thes e efforts have not been  effective. 121  Despite this 
ineffectiveness, th e co operative ef fort launched by the N RC m ay yet contribute to 
stemming the flow of drugs to Europe and limiting the resources of narco-terrorism and 
strategic crime. 
The Allies also have s tarted s erious transf ormation ef forts to develop  m ilitary 
capacity to meet the challenge this brand of terrorism brings, but the pace has not been as  
swift as the United States hoped that  it would be.  W hen Article 5 was invoked on 12 
September 2001, the United S tates seems to have  recalled the disjointed approach that 
NATO took during  the  Balkan campaigns.  The United Stat es also  seem s to have 
understood the lim ited unconventional capability the Allies could bring to bear against 
adversaries using unconventional tactics and the difficulties any Alliance deploym ent so 
far from  hom e would entail.  A NATO Par liamentary Assem bly report noted that, for 
these reasons, and the fact that United Stat es actions in Afghanistan “relied heavily on 
Special Forces” in the opening months of the operation, the United States took the lead in 
dislodging the Taliban and hunting  Al-Qaeda while the Allies operated m ainly in a  
combat support role.122 
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The previous chapter noted th e lack of specificity in NATO’s strategic vision.  In 
spite of  NATO’s signif icant post-Cold W ar tr ansformation efforts, the use of suc h a 
broad brush to chart the Alliance ’s vision regarding threats has not been as successf ul in 
readying the armed forces of the Allies to conf ront specific threats as it m ight have been.  
The additional difficulties of burden-sharing, technology gaps, and caveats also d iminish 
the potential that NATO has to overcome the security challenges that the next decade will 
bring.  This chapter has  outlined the most significant threats the Allies are likely  to f ace 
in the near to m id term and has highlighted th e fact that no threats can truly be iso lated 
from one another as there are connections with additional threats.  Islamic radicalism as a 
domestic problem in Allied  countries is conn ected to Islam ic radicalism in other Allied 
countries, as well as external radicals.  Energy security is related to unstable or politically 
fragile petro-producer states, som e of which have used their resources to dem onstrate 
power and curry political gain.   
The NSTI is intended to help to b ring Alliance m ilitary c apabilities to leve ls 
appropriate for confronting the threats discusse d in th is chapter, but the NSTI cann ot be 
expected to operate in a vacuum  independent of po litical, econom ic and inform ation 
power instrum ents and conventional (general  purpose) forces.  However, a unified 
strategy tha t pr ioritizes the thr eats exam ined here will facilitate developm ent of 
capabilities that are ap propriate for the threat.  The speci fic capabilities of SOF, general 
purpose forces, and  sp ecialized law enforcemen t pe rsonnel in dea ling with the issues  
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IV. SOF ROLES AND MISSIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: A CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The hostage cris is and  murder of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists during 
the 1972 Munich Olympics was a watershed event in Europe.  The crisis exposed the 
need for a highly speciali zed counterterrorism  (CT) force that could operate 
independently and bring extrem e force to bear against thos e perpetrating terror.  Since 
then, many NATO member countries have developed a specialized force within their law 
enforcement agencies responsible for hostage rescue operations or other in extremis 
requirements.  Commando organi zations such as  the French Groupe d'Intervention de la 
Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN), the Ger man Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG 9), the Dutch 
Dienst Speciale Interventies (DSI),  and the B elgian Escadron Special d’Intervention 
(ESI) are all organized, traine d and equipp ed to ensu re that cris es such as  that 
experienced in Munich in 1972 can be dealt with swiftly, forcefully and effectively. 
Nearly 30 years later, in October 2001, a small number of U.S. Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) led the invasion of Afghanist an to overthrow the Taliban regim e and 
eliminate th e threat of  terro rism posed by Al-Qaeda.  The invasion of Afghanistan 
demonstrated significan t shortcomings in th e militaries of NATO countries and h ad an 
impact comparable to  that of the Munich fa ilure on law enforcem ent agencies.  Carl Ek 
noted that “The conflict in Afghani stan marked a new developm ent in modern warfare 
through the extensiv e use of precision-gu ided m unitions, directed b y ground-b ased 
special forces; many believe th at th is step wide ned the cap abilities breach between  the  
United States and its European Allies.” 123  The capabilities  demonstrated by U.S. special 
operators in Afghanistan, coupl ed with growing asymmetric threats at home and abroad, 
highlighted the need f or Am erica’s NATO Allies to develop sim ilar capabilities , 
particularly in light of the terrorism that now threatened them. 
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This chapter examines the capabilities that NATO can bring to bear in confronting 
some of these threats.  Transform ation efforts such as the NATO Response Force (NRF)  
and the NATO SOF Tr ansformation Initiative (NSTI) are specifically designed to face 
twenty-first century security  challenges, and n ot necessarily those env isaged during the 
Cold W ar.  Colin Gray points out that, de spite the fact that the likelihood of high-
intensity co nflict a ppears to  have dim inished, the prospect  of participation in lower-
intensity conflicts remains s ignificant, and  it is  these  types of  engagements “for which 
SOF are especially well adapted.” 124  NATO’s recognition tha t the Alliance lacks a SOF 
capability to m atch the secur ity environm ent in which it f inds itse lf—dealing with 
asymmetric threa ts of  low intensity —is a lesson learned the hard way.  Beginning in 
Munich in 1972, this lesson was gleaned as a result of security shortcom ings that were 
recognized after a number of dom estic and tr ansnational experiences, but reinforced in 
the strongest term s by t he terrorist attack s of 11 Septem ber 2001 and the bom bings in 
Madrid and London, a mong others.  Clearly, the separatist and leftist terrorism with 
which Europe was intim ately fa miliar was being joined by a new and deadly brand of 
extremist terror.  Chapte r III of this thesis  noted that the th reat of terrorism has becom e 
one of  the Alliance ’s h ighest secur ity pr iorities, if  not the  highest.  NATO’s Military  
Concept for Defence Against Terrorism, adopted at the Prague Summit in 2002, supports 
this judgment.125   
B. GENERAL SOF ROLES AND MISSIONS 
David Tucker and Christopher Lamb have noted the necessity to consider “the 
distinguishing characteristics that make SOF valuable ” wh en “articulating a strategic 
concept” so that the roles and missions of SOF can be determ ined.126  Although no SOF 
core com petencies are accepted as univers al, a num ber of roles and m issions are 
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traditionally identif iable with special opera tions.  As a general ru le, these role s and 
missions require specialized training and special capabilities, and cannot be performed by 
general purpose forces (GPF) at “acceptable levels of risk and cost.”127 
In genera l term s, SOF roles and  m issions can be characterized as either 
commando operations or what ar e known as warrior-diplomat missions.  In the United 
States, SOF  have a wide variety of missions, which include counterterrorism (CT), direct 
action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal 
defense (FID), civil affairs (CA), psyc hological operations (PSYOP), hum anitarian 
assistance, search and rescue, information operations (IO), and ot hers.  David Gompert 
and Raymond Smith describe the primary U.S. SOF missions in Table 1. 
Table 1.   U.S. SOF Missions (From Gompert and Smith)128 
Counterterrorism Disrupt, de feat, and destro y terrorists and  their  
infrastructure 
Direct Action Raid, am bush, or assaul t critical targets in host ile or  
denied territory 
Special Reconnaissance Complement national and theater intelligence by  
obtaining specific and time sensitive “ground truth” 
Unconventional Warfare With local forces, respond to guerrilla warfare, 
insurgency, subversion, and sabotage 
Foreign Internal Defense Train, advise, and assist host -nation mi litary, 
paramilitary, and civil forces to hel p protect free and 
fragile societies 
Civil Affairs Coordinate U.S. military activities with foreign officials,  
U.S. civilian agencies, i nternational organizations, and 
nongovernmental organizations 
Psychological Operations Influence foreign views and behavior 
Humanitarian Assistance Deliver critical relief where and when others cannot 
Search and Rescue Extract personnel from  enem y territory  or denie d areas 
when conventional combat search and rescue capabilities 
are insufficient 
Information Operations Interfere wit h adversar y inform ation and infor mation 
systems while protecting U.S. systems 
Collateral Mission Areas Perform operations that include s ecurity assi stance, 
counterdrug operations, and peacekeeping 
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These m issions are generally thought of as  either direct or indirect.  Direct 
missions are typically understood to be those missions accomplished by SOF themselves, 
while indirect missions are gen erally accomplished using indigenous or surrogate fo rces 
and populations with SOF working in an advisory capacity .129  However, this description 
is not com prehensive enough to  provide political and m ilitary leaders sufficient 
understanding to m ake planning and e mployment decisions in developing SOF 
capabilities.  Tucker and Lam b provide a finer level of detail about  indirect missions and 
their strategic utility in noting that th ey “produce broader and more enduring results over 
time by reducing the appeal of terrorism and producing better  intelligence on terrorists’ 
operations.”130   
Whatever strateg ic aim  NATO has, indire ct m issions are designed to favorably 
alter the political landscape by underm ining support in a population for terrorist or 
insurgent movements.  By working in th is fashion, SOF can im prove the ability  of local 
forces to provide security by training and advising them  in tactics, techniques and 
procedures in com bating ter rorism and in surgencies.  In  turn,  this will result in “a  
reduction in terrorism’s m ass appeal, a redu ction in r ecruits, and  growth in  the  
willingness of those with knowledge of the te rrorists to sto p supportin g them , or even  
better to be tray them .”131  Working indirectly is not m erely a m atter of passive SOF 
presence an d teaching sim ple tasks to surrogate forces in  the hope that terrorist and 
insurgent groups will b e deterred from operating in these areas.  In fact,  it requires g reat 
commitment to employ SOF in such a protract ed fashion, often in unstable and insecure 
environments, and without the benefit of logi stical and administrative support associated 
with deployments of much larger conventional forces to an operating area. 
In testim ony to the Senate Arm ed Services C ommittee re garding the  curren t 
posture of U.S. SOF, the Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, Admiral 
Eric T. Olson, characterized direct m issions in the current war on terrorism  as an  
                                                 
129 Tucker and Lamb, 153. 
130 Ibid., 175. 
131 Ibid. 
 51
approach that “addres ses the imm ediate requirement to pursue terro rists, their 
infrastructure and their r esources.”132  He said tha t the “indire ct approach addresses the 
underlying causes of terrorism  and the envi ronments in which terrorism  activities 
occur.”133  It would appear that the value of em ploying SOF in an indirect approach is 
more productive than a direct approach in  achieving strategic obj ectives, although the 
indirect approach has n ot been widely accepte d as a priority at m any leadersh ip levels 
due to a general tendency to resist the protra cted nature of indirect m issions, as well as 
dissatisfaction with the absence of the concre te m etrics that a re ava ilable in  direct 
missions. 
Neither direct nor indirect approaches are employed exclusively in CT operations.  
In fact, Tucker and Lam b categorize dir ect m issions specifically as CT, counter-
proliferation, DA, SR, a nd IO. 134  The y categorize indirect m issions as UW, PSYOP, 
FID, and CA.135  However, direct and indirect missions often overlap, and tend to have a 
symbiotic effect on one another in achie ving desired outcom es, particularly in 
confronting an asymmetric adversary. 
The first chapter of this thesis all uded to the strategi c utility found in 
appropriately employed SOF.  In his book Explorations in Strategy, Gray discusses how 
SOF can be a strateg ic asset, bu t notes that their s trategic value r esides in their proper 
employment.136  His m odel of strategic dem and fo r SOF effectiveness co nsiders fiv e 
types of threat: balance-of-power probl ems, regional roguery, local disorder, 
nontraditional threats, and em ergencies (what he term s “911”). 137  In this  model direct 
and indirect m issions can provide  a sta te’s lea dership with  signif icant stra tegic gain if  
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employed in support of the national interest and strategy.  Gray fu rther notes that the  
utility that SOF offer “in the new security e nvironment must flow from responses to the 
demands of policy.”138  Tucker and Lamb corroborate this argument in writing that “SOF 
theoretically can provid e disproportionate value by controlling m ilitary and political 
costs, both dom estic and in ternational, through sm all-unit activities that produce 
discriminate effects in ways that conventional forces cannot .”139  Rothstein lends further 
support to the argument in noting that the stra tegic utility of SOF has been dem onstrated 
numerous times, but that “there are three ca tegories of operations that are exception ally 
significant—economy of force, expansion of choice, and shaping of the future.”140 
C. NATO CAPABILITIES AND ASYMMETRIC THREATS 
The previous chapter discussed the threat s examined in NATO’s strategic visio n 
documents in light of recent, current, and poten tial future security dilemmas.  Spillover, 
instability, extremism, terror ism, strategic c rime, and the des tabilizing effects of  failing 
states are of  great conc ern to the Allies.  Cer tainly, m any of  these issues over lap and 
converge to intensify the nature of the threat and further serv e as cause for concern.  T he 
transnational nature of these threats has the potential, such as Afghanistan might have had 
before the October 2001 U.S.-led invasion, to  become a danger that NATO m ust address 
proactively in order to m itigate the threats in a tim ely fashion.  The lessons that N ATO 
learned evidently sparked transformation initiatives such as the NRF and the NSTI.  The 
Allies apparently intend to develop capabilities to counter such threats in the future.  For  
example, a hostage rescue cris is at the Mun ich Olym pics wa s the starkest instan ce in  
which it was determ ined that a dedicated com mando capability was needed to confront  
terrorism, though at the tim e it was deemed a law enforcement requirement.  Subsequent 
experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan reinforced th e need for a NATO rapid  
reaction capability and a SOF capability.   
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Allied Jo int Publicatio n-3.5 (AJP -3.5), Allied Joint Doctrine for Special 
Operations, notes that the rescue of hostages is essentially “a national responsibility” and 
that plans to confront such crises using national means will most likely have been long-
developed independently at the national level. 141  In fact, groups such as GSG 9 and 
GIGN have dem onstrated the resolve and ab ility to su ccessfully over come terror ists 
during hos tage res cues on a num ber of occas ions.  One exam ple was seen when  the 
German commandos dem onstrated their readine ss to operate in distant countries during 
the Lufthansa airliner hijacking and rescue in Somalia in 1977.  In future instances of this 
nature, they will doubtless be called upon to do the same.  According to Colonel Russell 
Howard, Director of the U.S. Military Acad emy’s Combating Terrorism Center, this is 
particularly true in light of  the skeptical opin ion that most Europeans have regarding the 
use of  the m ilitary aga inst te rrorists, cons idering terror ism instead a law enf orcement 
responsibility.142  However, in the event a crisis that  requires such a response occurs in a 
distant country and concerns an Ally with lim ited SOF capability, how m ight NATO be 
asked to respond? 
In events such as h ostage rescue  operations inside NATO’s geographic 
boundaries, the responding organization woul d alm ost certainly be from  the law  
enforcement establishment.  Most Western countries delineate role s and responsibilities 
regarding th e em ployment of  the m ilitary an d the police.  However, a  nation  m ay not 
have sufficiently robust capability in its law enforcement structure to confront immediate 
threats and crises, and m ay not have the requisite  capability within its a rmed forces.  In 
such a scenario, AJP-3.5 notes that NATO SOF could be called upon to respond to the 
crisis and conduct the operation on behalf of the Alliance member.143  While this has not 
happened thus f ar, NATO SOF have been em ployed in m ultilateral oper ations in  
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Afghanistan since 2002, with Denmark, Fran ce, Germany, Norway, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and others contribu ting SOF to m issions across the spectrum  of special 
operations.144  However, the Allies have prioritized developm ent of the ir individua l 
capabilities to meet the threats that they perceive as being the greatest.  In fact, according 
to the In ternational Ins titute f or Strateg ic Stud ies, all of  the NATO European Allie s 
perceive transnational and/or asymm etric threats as being greatest to them , though only 
Poland, Spain, and the United Kingd om list SOF as a priority capability.145  Many Allies 
have more conventional tactical priorities  or command and contro l capabilities in their 
force development plans, which m ay be a refl ection of their national obligations tow ard 
meeting NATO standards and contributing to the NRF. 
1. NRF and Asymmetric Threats 
Collectively, NATO has a highly c apable and well-train ed m ilitary f orce.  All 
Allies except Iceland (which has no m ilitary) can contribute armed forces in support of a  
larger military opera tion within the new NAT O Force Struc ture.  Som e NATO nations 
are capable of fielding arm ies, navies and  air forces that are am ong the m ost h ighly 
qualified in the world today.  However, the forces that most nations are able to contribute 
are GPF, and the resour ces of  the Allies vary  consider ably.  As a result, the m ilitary 
capabilities of  the Allie s avai lable f or use in NATO operations d iffer.  In f act, s ome 
Allied na tions are on ly able to co ntribute sm all quan tities of  f orces to the  gre ater 
operational effort, as has been witnesse d during the Balkan operations and in 
Afghanistan.  To com pensate, NA TO leader s agreed at the Pra gue Summit in 2002 to 
develop the NRF, a force intended to eventually be 25,000 strong.  According to the NRF 
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website, the force “has been acting as the engin e for transform ing NATO into a much  
stronger and more effective military organization.”146 
By design, the NRF is structured to be “the Alliance’s  rapidly deployable 
multinational unit made up of land, air, m aritime and Special Forces components.”147  In 
developing the NRF, th e land,  m aritime and air com ponents were established  with  an 
associated command and contro l structure and rotating forces  standing ready to respond 
to whatever the North Atlantic Council (NAC) determines is necessary.  Thus far, the 
NRF has been m obilized f or two continge ncy opera tions, Hurric ane Katrina  in  New 
Orleans, and the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.  The NRF proved on both  occasions that it 
can be activated and deployed w ith a re latively short response tim e, although the 
humanitarian nature of  these oper ations is le ss politica lly volatile than a m ilitary 
operation that might require the use of lethal force. 
The NRF has the po tential to p rovide form idable land, m aritime and air 
capabilities that can res pond to a variety of security  th reats.  However, the capabilities  
that the NRF offers can be negated by politic al disagreem ents on a variety of issues.  
These disag reements may lead go vernments to play “red  cards” and /or to es tablish 
caveats about the  appropriate level of  military intervention by the curr ent forces in the  
NRF rotation.  Resource shortfalls also may hamper the NRF’s effectiveness, particularly 
in light of  the f ailure of  some Allies to m eet burden shar ing goals in a llocating forces.  
The International Ins titute for Strategic St udies recently pointed out that, while NATO’s 
objective is to have 40 % of Allied  land forces  deployable,  just “2.7% of Europe’s two 
million military are capa ble of overseas deployment.”148  A group of experts noted that 
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there is discussion about possibly reducing the NRF fo rce requirem ent from  25,000 
troops to 10 ,000 in light of the difficulties that the Alliance has had in m eeting desired 
troop strength.149 
Funding m ilitary operations has becom e a point of contention as well.  As it 
stands, funding for NRF operati ons is supplied by the countrie s providing forces in the 
NRF rotation.  This caused som e disconten t in the Spanish government when it bore 
much of the cost of the NRF operation to prov ide relief efforts in the wa ke of a m assive 
earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005.  Fu rther, since the NAC must arrive at a 
consensus to allow the NRF to respond, the eff ectiveness of the force m ay be li mited in 
those instances where time is of the essence.  In his analysis of the 2004 Istanbul Summit, 
C. Richard Nelson validated that point wh en he wrote that “there are no standing 
provisions f or pre -emptive m ilitary operations by the Allian ce. In this way, any direc t 
action by the Alliance against terroris ts or  those who harbour them requires prio r 
approval by all member nations.”150  With this in mind, the NRF may have limited utility 
in m ilitary operations that dem and an i mmediate respons e.  Whatever capabilities  the  
NRF provides, the f act remains that the SO F capabilities of  most Allies have not been  
developed as robustly as thos e of their GPF, although the NSTI is a significant step 
toward that end. 
2. Doctrinal NATO SOF Capabilities 
Nearly all of the 26 Allies have SOF as pa rt of their armed forces.  When viewed 
collectively, NATO’s SOF provide the capabil ities to m eet and overcom e virtually any 
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challenge using a wide variety of tactics, techniques and procedures.  However, when 
viewed individually, th e SOF capability of  so me Alliance  m embers is  quite thin.  The 
reason for such a lim ited development of SO F among some member countries is that the 
individual Ally’s  requ irement f or such cap ability is  deter mined by nationa l ob jectives, 
and a country will almost certainly not commit scarce resources to developing a 
capability when its governm ent does not deem  it necessary o r when the requirem ent is 
not pressing enough.  W ith that in m ind, it is  easy to understand why countries such as 
Latvia and Lithuania maintain one Special Forces team each, while the United States has  
thousands of SOF with skills designed to accomplish missions throughout the spectrum  
of military operations. 
As part of the NSTI, th e Alliance cr eated the NATO SOF Coordination Centre 
(NSCC).  The inten t of  this o rganization is  to  be the “fo cal poin t for NATO Special 
Operations expertise” for the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (SACEUR) and Allied 
Command Operations (ACO).151  The NSCC i s therefore co-located  at Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium .  The prim ary mission 
of the NSCC is to develop policy and doctrine for the employment of NATO SOF, and to 
develop and synchronize NATO SOF education, training, and exercises, as well as th e 
training centers required.152  Ultimately, it is the res ponsibility of the NSCC to optim ize 
the burden-sharing responsibiliti es in view of the expected  and curren t SOF capabilities 
of the NATO nations.  The principal tasks exp ected of contributing nations will have to 
be performed to an acceptable level, and how well or poorly Alliance members have done 
to date has not been m ade public.  Milita ry Committee 437/1 (MC 437/1) is a classified 
document which codif ies the capability s tandards required of contributing nations.  The  
NSCC is charged with ensuring that contri buting nations m eet th e stan dards outlin ed 
therein. 
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AJP-3.5 requires  that SOF engage in four m issions: 1) peacetim e m ilitary 
engagement; 2) peace su pport operations; 3 ) counter irregular threat operation s; and  4) 
major combat operations.153  The docum ent further states that the tasks th at NATO SOF 
are expected to be prepared to conduct ar e special reconnaissance surveillance (SR), 
direct actio n (DA), and m ilitary assis tance ( MA).154  According to AJP-3.5, these 
principal tasks are defined as follows: 
- SR: “Predom inately HUMINT function th at places ‘eyes on target’ in hostile,  
denied, or politically sensitive territory.”155 
- DA: “Foc used on specific, well-define d targets of strategic and operational 
significance, or in the conduct of decisive tactical operations.”156 
- MA: “A broad spectrum of measures in support of friendly forces throughout the 
spectrum of conflict.”157 
AJP-3.5 is careful to no te that each NAT O member country has different “m odes 
and levels of e mployment” for its natio nal SOF.  For the NSCC, the im portant 
consideration is th at S OF are stra tegic asse ts which sho uld be em ployed to re alize 
benefits at the “strateg ic and operational levels.” 158  21 of  the 25 Allie s (exclud ing 
Iceland) have SOF capability of  some sort .  Eight Allie s—Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Slovenia—have SOF units that 
are smaller than battalio n size.159  On the other hand, som e na tions have much greater 
SOF capabilities that are suited for tasks th roughout the spectrum of military operations.  
Belgium, Fr ance, Germany, Italy, Spain, Tu rkey, and the United Kin gdom each have 
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brigade size or larger u nits, and the rem aining NATO m embers maintain battalion-level 
SOF elem ents at a m inimum.160  While specific nation al S OF capabilities  are clos ely 
guarded for national security reason s, each of  these SOF units is c apable of m eeting the 
DA and SR task requirements outlined in AJP-3.5.161   
The MA portion of the task set includes training and advisory missions “by, with, 
or through friendly forces that are traine d, equipped, supported, or em ployed in varying 
degrees by SOF.” 162  Als o within th e MA m ission set are  the m ore tra ditional SO F 
missions such as FID, in which SOF are tasked  to train  h ost na tion s ecurity f orces to  
bring stability to a country.  It is in thes e arenas that NATO SOF can yield the greatest 
benefit for the Allian ce by ensuring  that an  unconventional and asymmetric approach is 
adopted in dealing with present and future secu rity threats to elim inate them before they 
are m anifested m ore significantly.   However,  this approach can also be hindered by 
political decisions because the results of  su ch m issions are less tangible and  less 
measureable than  those  of  cer tain other m ilitary oper ations, and are  not traditio nally 
reported by  the m edia.  In the r ecent Am erican exper ience, these types of  m ilitary 
operations tend to be ignored (o r concealed ) because they are the “antith esis of the 
Pentagon’s long-standing preoccupation with rapidly-achieved, measureable effects.”163 
D. CONCLUSION 
There are m any considerations in o pting to em ploy SOF in place of GPF.  Gray 
notes that SOF are severely lim ited as a “substitute for GPF.” 164  Likewise, the inverse 
holds true, that SOF cannot be readily repl aced by GPF for those roles and m issions for 
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which they are des igned.  One of the typ ical defining ch aracteristics of SOF is their 
ability to o perate in ho stile, denied , and po litically sen sitive areas.  Tu cker and Lamb 
note that a significant difference between SOF and GPF is found in the “unique training, 
capabilities, and skills [ that] allow them  to operate successf ully in suc h an 
environment.”165  The ability of SOF to operate with  a smaller operational footprint than 
GPF, and yet with great flexibility and adaptability, make them ideal for certain roles and 
missions.  However, Gray astutely w arns that the capabilities and strategic utility of SOF 
“are not a panacea.”166 
As NATO continues  the initiative in developing an Alliance SOF capability, it is  
important for leaders to be well educated about what SOF capabilities are, as well as how 
SOF should be employed.  In crises that dem and an immediate response, such as hostage 
rescues, it stands to reas on tha t the  indiv idual Ally’s government and law enforcem ent 
agencies will have primary responsibility for the crisis, which almost certainly holds true 
both within the country and outside the country.  There are precedents for both scenarios, 
and the law enforcem ent personnel that have been called upon to execute the operations 
have been by and large successful.  Howeve r, in the event th at a country ’s law  
enforcement agencies are incapable of resolving  in extremis problems, t here m ay be a 
need f or o ne or a nu mber of  Allies to r ender ass istance, potentially requiring  the 
capabilities found in SOF. 
Since U.S. SOF are the m ost robust and the largest in the world in term s of 
manpower and resources, it stands to reason that NATO, with the Un ited States  a s an 
Ally, ought to be capable of m eeting all thre ats that would requir e the use of SOF.  
However, Gompert and Smith note that this fact , in and of itself, does not m ean that U.S. 
SOF are “su perior in every mission or skill set. ”167  They no te that som e NATO Allies 
possess “deep cultural awareness and access” to countries that the United States simply 
does not, and that this can provide a solid  foundation for operations  that require the 
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development of “indigenous antiterror forces,” pa rticularly in previous  colonial areas in 
Africa and the Middle East and in Europe itself. 168  However, the process of education, 
training and  exerc ises will c ertainly have a mutually ben eficial ef fect on SOF o f all 
participating nations as tactics, techniques, and procedures are shared among partners and 
refined over time.  Additionally, the cultural sk ill set that European SOF may excel in as 
a result of long-term  exposure to countries in  high-priority regions can be shared with 
Allies that have had less exposure to these regions. 
NATO SOF have been operating in Af ghanistan since 2002.  However, the 
Afghanistan experience m ay not be the best example of the approp riate use of SOF.  
Volumes have been written abou t the im petus lost after incredible acco mplishments by 
SOF.  These achievem ents were m arginalized by the ins istence on GPF em ployment in 
the face of a growing asymmetric enem y.  Under the auspices of  the International 
Security Assistance Force, NATO currently leads military operations in Afghanistan with 
both GPF and SOF c ontributions for the mi ssions ou tside the U.S.-led Operatio n 
Enduring Freedom.  Additionall y, NATO cont inues to fulfill s ecurity responsibilities in  
the Balkans  as the United Nations m ission transitions to th e European Union.  Both of 
these examples demonstrate that NATO is capable of deploying large nu mbers of armed 
forces to protracted combat and stabilization operations.  Both examples also demonstrate 
that NATO still ha s great room for improvement.  Until the NRF is called upon to prove 
its utility in non-hum anitarian operations, one can only make assum ptions about how 
well or poorly the force will perform. 
This chapter exam ined SOF roles and m issions in general term s, and considered 
what is expected of NATO SOF under the NSTI.  Additionally, this chapter discussed the 
strategic utility found in properly employed SO F.  The previous two chapters discussed 
NATO’s strategic documents and their m ost salient threats.  In add ressing these threats,  
the c riteria f or NATO to use  existing GPF, either throug h activation  of the NR F or 
NATO’s traditional forces, or national law enforcement agencies, hav e not been well 
defined.  The next chapter analyzes the Alliance’s strategic outlook vis-à-vis the potential 
threats and SOF capabilities. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Previous chapters of this thes is often referred to the m assive transformation that 
NATO has undertaken in the post-Cold W ar era.  Som e have argued that NATO’s 
transformation came too late, or have questi oned the need for such an alliance given the 
absence of a distinc t and potentia lly existential threat such  as the Allia nce faced durin g 
the Cold War.  But even in the months before the actual collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Wittmann Paper predicted the rapidly evolvi ng security environm ent in which N ATO 
would soon find itself. 169  As the W ittmann Paper forecas t, the end of the Cold W ar 
brought instability, including fa iled states and terrorism .  These and other asymm etric 
challenges to the g lobal security environment forced NATO to change its  posture away 
from one focused on  deterrence and  prepare dness to defend agains t a S oviet invasion 
toward a more flexible and expeditionary force able to confront security threats across the 
continuum of potential challeng es.  Quite significantly, the Alliance’s post-Cold  W ar 
experiences brought to light the need to de velop a special operati ons capability, w hich 
served as  th e catalyst f or the NATO Special  Operations  Forces (SO F) Transform ation 
Initiative (NSTI). 
Chapter II of this thesis analyzed NATO’s strategic vision and how the Alliance is 
posturing itself for the twenty-first century security environment.  The conclusions drawn 
from Chapter II high light the fact that NATO views security more globally than was  the 
case during the Cold War and the years immediately thereafter.  When vi ewed 
collectively, the four prim ary strategy documents exam ined—NATO’s 1999 Strategic  
Concept, th e 2004 Strategic Vision  docum ent, NATO’s Military Concept for Defense 
Against Terrorism , and NATO’s Com prehensive Political Guidance—point to new 
thinking in security stra tegy which is f ocused on asymmetric th reats, instab ility, and 
terrorism. 
                                                 
169 See Chapter III of this thesis for a discussion of the Wittmann Paper and its prediction of the 
looming security challenges. 
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Chapter I II of  this thes is exam ined th e contem porary security environm ent and 
identified potential threats to the  Alliance.  Th is dete rmination was m ade by ana lyzing 
NATO’s presentation o f security concerns in publicly available strategy docum ents and 
by assessin g the Alliance’s m ost significan t vul nerabilities.  Of  th ese vuln erabilities, 
terrorism must be considered the gravest c oncern at present.  However, the global and 
extensively networked nature of terrorist  groups m agnifies the security threat 
significantly.  Moreove r, som e terroris ts a re associated with crim inal elem ents and 
benefit from safe havens found in weak, unstable, and failin g states.  Th e complexity of 
these combined phenomena is a far cry from the Cold-War era threat of a Soviet invasion 
of Western Europe.  Despite the standing requirem ent to posture f or high-intensity 
conflict, the Allies regard the li kelihood of this occurring in  the near or m edium term as 
low. 
Chapter IV of  this thes is discussed the current SOF capabilitie s of the Allies, a s 
well as the expectations  in capabilities fo r troop contributing nations in m eeting SOF 
standards as part of the NS TI.  How SOF are employed, and the roles and m issions they 
perform, are significantly different from those of general purpose forces (GPF).  Because 
they are un ique, the capabilities SOF are able  to bring to bear ar e id eal for specific 
missions.  However, there are perils in subst ituting SOF for tasks better suited for GPF or 
law enforcem ent agencies.  Many experts po int to the value SOF ha ve in producing 
effects, through direct and i ndirect m issions, that contribu te to realizing a nation’s 
strategic objectives and shaping problematic security environments toward that end. 
This chap ter exam ines the assess ments of the prev ious three chapters.  Th e 
objective is to identify the opportun ities and challenges that the NSTI faces by balancing 
NATO’s strategic vision with re alistic threats to security and the cap abilities resident in 
NATO SOF contributing nations.  This chap ter concludes with recommendations for 
NATO in developing SOF capabilities. 
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B. CHALLENGES 
As discussed in the previous three ch apters, the are a of em phasis for the 
Alliance’s f uture m ilitary operatio ns will pro bably be outside NATO’s geogra phic 
borders.  It is im plied in NATO’s strategy docu ments that collec tive defense, while stil l 
the Alliance’s raison d’être, is no longer the sole security  consideration.  Since 1992 
NATO has been engag ed in m ilitary operati ons outside its geographic borders.  The 
Alliance will continue to be so engaged for the foreseeable future in order to mitigate the 
dangers to the global security environm ent caused by terrorism , organized crime, weak 
and failing states, the prolifer ation of weapons of m ass de struction and their delivery 
means, spillover f rom instability o n its pe riphery, and re lated conce rns express ed in 
strategy docum ents.  However, NATO has a nu mber of challenges to overcom e if its  
capabilities are to be developed and used to their fullest potential. 
To begin with, NATO’s political dy namics and strategic ou tlook could s erve as 
constraints on the effe ctive use of SOF.  Chapter I I dis cussed the two m ost salien t 
limitations: the lack of a unified strategic vision for SOF, and political shortcomings such 
as consensus-based decision m aking, caveats, and “red cards.”  This is n ot to imply that 
NATO has no strategic vision. In fact, just the opposite is true.  NATO’s publicly 
available strategic visio n is quite b road a nd far-reach ing.  However, as far as alig ning 
political pr iorities with m ilitary cap abilities is c oncerned, th e strategic vision is ra ther 
ambiguous.  It do es not facilitate the p rioritization an d development of m ilitary 
capabilities to deal wi th twenty-first century security concerns.  Chapter II took note of 
the chagrin of General Jam es L. Jones, former SACEUR, when he noted that the 
consensus model has been adopted in NATO’s m any committees.  The delays  and 
compromises stemm ing from  reliance on the consensus  m odel are exacerb ated b y 
national political rivalries between Allies that sometimes hamstring agreements at NATO 
headquarters.170  While consensus-based decision making has served the Alliance well in 
speaking with a unified voice at the highest poli tical levels, this shortcoming at the lower 
                                                 
170 David S. Yost, “An Interview with General James L. Jones, USMC, Retired, Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe,” NATO Defense College Research Paper, 34 (January 2008), 3-4, 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/rp_34.pdf  (accessed 26 August 2008). 
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levels will not serve th e Alliance ’s best in terests in em ploying SOF ef fectively.  The 
politically-driven practice of placin g caveats and “red cards” on the usability of forces  
could marginalize the potential effectiveness of SOF even further. 
The NATO SOF governing doctrine, while qui te comprehensive, has a significant 
inadequacy in that it does not place e mphasis on the unique ability of SOF to shape the 
operating e nvironment to align w ith desired  Alliance secu rity goa ls.  Ordinarily, this  
function would f all with in the area  that NATO term s Milita ry Assistance (MA), wh ich 
takes advantage of the ability of SOF to use knowledge of the local environm ent and 
population to shape the security co nditions fa vorably in meeting strategic objectiv es.  
Allied Jo int Publication -3.5 (AJP-3 .5), Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 
rightly notes that “NATO SOF ar e strategic as sets,” the pro per employment of which is 
“realized at the strategic and operational levels.”171  The document also notes that special 
operations are normally conducted “to achieve military objectives that can have m ilitary, 
diplomatic, inform ational, or econom ic e ffects.”172  As Chapter IV describes, AJP-3.5 
defines training and advisory m issions and cap tures the extrem ely broad nature of MA 
roles and missions, although it falls short of providing the specificity that the Direct 
Action (DA) and Special Reconnaissance and Surv eillance (SR) task descriptions offer.  
Additionally, the MA capability stan dards that are outlined in Military Committee 437/1 
have not been achieved by the SOF of ev ery NATO troop contri buting nation, although 
these capabilities ex ist in non-SOF branches of  Allied armed forces.  In fact, while all 
NATO SOF troop contributing nations have resident DA and SR capabilities, only a 
handful have resident MA capability in their SOF. 173  This deficiency m ay constrain the 
ability of the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) to work toward the develop ment  
 
 
                                                 
171 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, AJP-3.5, Ratification Draft 1” NATO, 2008 
https://nsa.nato.int/protected/unclass/ap/Dr%20AP/AJP-3.5%20RD1.pdf (available with account access 
only; accessed 11 August 2008), 1-1. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Author’s interview with an expert observer at the NSCC, 9 December 2008. 
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of critical capabilities.  This  could also leave the Allies in a precariou s position s hould 
these skills be requ ired for an em erging crisis at a tim e when the available con tributing 
nations’ SOF do not have such a capability. 
Chapter II a lso highlighted the failure of the Allies to m eet their informal pledge 
in 2002 of an annual two percent of GDP investm ent in m ilitary expenditu res.  
Inadequate defense spending may constrain the effectiveness of NATO SOF, particularly 
in those nations that are developing SOF capab ility from low levels that will be expected 
to m eet perform ance and comm and and cont rol standards as quickly as possible.  
Interoperability prob lems with communications equipm ent and  comm and and control 
systems may also hinder the effective develo pment and employment of NATO SOF.  As 
the individual Allies make difficult prioritization decisions regard ing resource allocation 
for their arm ed forces, equipm ent unique to SO F that is required f or interoperability in 
NATO operations could fall below the funding threshold if other program s are deem ed 
more critical in an Ally’s procurem ent planning.  These funding and com patibility 
problems exist currently in the NSTI,174 and could negatively impact the ability of Allied 
SOF to be em ployed in NATO Response Force or C ombined Joint Task F orce 
operations.175 
Another possible lim itation in SOF capability is in the inf ormation realm.  Over 
the years, U.S. SOF have increasingly placed  great value on the role of infor mation 
operations (IO) and psychological operations (PSYOPS) in achieving their goals.  This  
capability is not considered a requirement for SOF under the NSTI.  This omission of this 
capability may actually create a m ore diffi cult and com plex operating environm ent for 
NATO SOF because of  the critica lity of esta blishing a po sitive re lationship with  the 
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175 The Alliance reorganized its command and force structures as part of its transformation to a more 
flexible and expeditionary posture.  The Combined Joint Task Force is designed to provide command and 
control during military operations at strategic, operational and tactical levels.  According to NATO, CJTFs 
are multinational and multiservice organizations “formed for a specific mission (task) from within the full 
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Military Command Structure,” Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Allied Command Operations, 
16 May 2008 http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/ncs/ncsindex.htm (accessed 5 July 2008). 
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population in the areas in which they opera te, and in preventing the adversary fro m 
establishing such a relationship.  This is partic ularly true in the struggle against terrorism 
and insurgency.  An Atlantic Council study  characterized NATO’s  use of ideas in 
persuading populations to turn against terrorism as indirect , consisting essentially of 
security support to governm ents.  The st udy points out NATO’s shor tsightedness in the 
war of ideas.  According to the study, “NATO has the potential, as it did during the Cold 
War, to offer an attractive, positive vision of diversity, tolerance and progress beneath its 
security umbrella that could m ake a valuab le contribution to th e overall confrontation 
with inte rnational ter rorists.”176  Recent disag reements about the information strateg y 
within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan brought to light 
differences of opinion about how IO and PSYOPS should be employed.  The commander 
of ISAF, General David McKiernan, was forced to reverse his decision to combine public 
affairs, IO, and PSYOPS at ISAF headquarters.177 
C. OPPORTUNITIES 
NATO has demonstrated its desire to deve lop a capability  to address asymmetric 
threats, and t he NSTI  has gr eat po tential as a m eans to th at end.   Th e collective  SOF 
attributes that member nations bring to the table could, if employed properly, ensure that 
the Alliance’s security objectives are met in the long and short term.  SOF bring the ideal 
set of  tools to work toward m eeting the secu rity cha llenges outlin ed in the Alliance’s  
strategy documents.   
The process of education, training a nd exercises m ay have a sym biotic and 
mutually beneficial ef fect on SOF of  all pa rticipating Allies f or th ree primary reasons.  
First, NSTI intends to provide a unique  and focused forum in which the NATO SOF 
community can learn new tactics, techniques, and procedures as they develop and share 
                                                 
176 NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism, (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of 
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training and  experiences over tim e.  Som e Allies have experiences in dealing with 
insurgencies in for mer colonies th at others have not, and the experiences gleaned while 
conducting counter-insurgency and unconventiona l warfare operations could be shared 
with the rest of the SOF troop contributing nations to add value to the SOF capabilities of 
the individual nations and to NATO SOF more generally. 
Second, as suggested above, the cultural skill set that some European SOF have as 
a result of long-term  colonial exposure to countries  and populations in regions prone to 
instability can be shared with Allies th at have less experience in unconventional or 
irregular operations.  This keen in sight rega rding loc al c ultural f actors and  political 
circumstances can pro vide invalu able capab ility to em ploy SOF in MA roles  and 
missions to develop indigenous security capac ity, elim inate terroris t and crim inal safe  
havens, and m ost im portantly, to serve as a c atalyst in b ringing NATO’s str ategic 
objectives to fruition.  The 1999 Strategic C oncept recognizes the potential requirement 
for NATO to engage in operations if countri es in the Euro-Atlantic area suffer political  
upheavals, or if any Allies face spillover from nearby conflicts.178  NATO SOF employed 
in protracted MA operations m ay prevent such crises from emerging in a volatile fashion 
and preclude the need for a conflict management or crisis response mission such as those 
reflected in the Alliance’s “fundamental security tasks.”179 
Third, NSTI is the first and best opportuni ty that m any nations have to be vital 
contributors to the Allia nce.  Developing nich e capabilities such as training centers that 
take advantage of  skills or geogra phic loca tions will ensu re that sm aller, newer Allies  
with fewer resources can beco me better able to provide key support m echanisms to their 
NATO partners.  NSTI provides an opportun ity for NATO nations to develop and 
commit a more relevan t force to an  operation than the g eneral purpose forces th at they 
might otherwise be obliged to em ploy at grea ter cos t in o rder to achieve com parable 
effects.   
                                                 
178 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO Press Release, Washington Summit, 24 April 1999, 
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NSTI provides greate r potential re ward for the Alliance th an simply developing 
the SOF capability of  the troop  contr ibuting nations.  There is the potential for 
engagement in troubled regions or states to prevent the emergence of any of the sec urity 
risks outlined in the 1999 Stra tegic Concept.  If the NS TI is pursued within the 
framework of NATO’s outreach programs, such as the Partnership for Peace, the NATO-
Russia Council, and th e Mediterranean Dialog ue, it m ay provide th e Alliance with the  
opportunity to establish rapport w ith potential partners that have similar concerns about 
the twenty-first century security environment, but have far less capacity and resources to 
commit to dealing with the problem s.  A plan to engage NATO SOF with potential 
partners in unstable regions and countries follows the logic of experts such as Colin Gray, 
Hy Rothstein, David T ucker, and Christophe r Lam b, who essentially argue that the 
greatest benefit of SOF is f ound in their strategi c utility.  NATO SOF,  if em ployed in 
these roles and m issions, could allow NATO to “shape the f uture” if  the political 
conditions allow it.180 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
NATO is greate r than the sum  of its par ts.  Its streng th lies not on ly in the  
awesome military capability that can be brought to bear on the battlefield,  but also in the 
diplomatic and economic assets that the 26 individual nations can use collectively to 
resolve s ecurity dilemm as.  However, NAT O military capabilities are not optim ally 
configured to confront and contend with th e unconventional challenges  that the Alliance 
faces in the near-to-mid term.  In characterizing NATO’s military dominance, John Leech 
noted that “in the kind of war m ost likely to face us, we shall find that our weapons have 
become so highly sophisticated that any tr aditional conflict beco mes largely one-sided” 
and that “such a war would be unfair and devoid of heroism .”181  With this in mind, and 
as the Allies acknowledge, it is unlikely that  an adversary would confront NATO in a 
                                                 
180 Hy Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: 
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conventional engagement.  This highlights th e Alliance’s vulnerability to unconventional 
campaigns.  NATO’s Com prehensive Political Guidance pointedly n otes tha t “s pecial 
focus” must be placed “on the m ost likely operations” and that the Alliance must be able 
to respond “to current and future operational requirements.”182  History has demonstrated 
repeatedly that a conv entional ap proach to  warfare can not effectiv ely confron t an 
unconventional adversary. 
Authors such as John Arquilla, M artin van Creveld and Thom as X. Ha mmes, 
among m any others, have written  extensivel y about how the nature of warfa re is 
changing away from high-intensity conflict in a conventional major theater war toward an 
asymmetric style of conflict.183  This type of warfare has been branded with term s such 
as low-intensity conflict, asymmetric warfare, and fourth generation warfare.  W hatever 
name this style of warfare is given, it seems clear that it has become the dominant form of 
warfare in the twenty-first century.  As Chapters II and III noted, NATO’s own published 
strategy docum ents support this  judgm ent, and the perceive d greatest threats at the 
national level of the individual Allies reflect this view as well.   
If the Allies  truly understand their g reatest threats to be asy mmetric, it stands to  
reason that NATO expe cts future confrontatio ns to be built on a guerrilla m odel.  A 
NATO publication notes that th is type of c onflict is not restricted to  “centuries -old 
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guerrilla warfare” but is a convergence of guerrilla tactics w ith “technological 
developments of m odern tim es.”184  From a tactical st andpoint, nowhere has the 
philosophy been m ore succinctly captured ab out how a force shou ld engage a better 
manned, better armed, and better resourced ar my than by Mao Tse-Tung when he wrote 
that, “when guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass 
him when he stops; strike him  whe n he is weary; pursue him  when he  withdraws.  In 
guerrilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, 
and there he m ust be harassed, attacke d, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated.” 185  This 
strategy was used to great effect against the United States in Vietnam, and against France 
in Vietnam and Algeria; and it appears to have become the adopted strategy against ISAF 
in Afghanistan. 
The prim ary threats to  NATO are, in f act, asymm etric.  The Allianc e is not 
currently structured to respond against non- state entities to whom  borders have no 
significance and who operate freely in weak and failing stat es with unstable governments 
that cannot effectively oppose their actions.  The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan is 
evidence of that, as guerri lla-style operations conducted by  the Taliban have become  
more lethal and have diminished political support among the Allies for operations in that 
country.  F orces with expertis e in confronting such asymm etric threats m ust be given 
priority in the near  term so that the Alliance will be  prepared to dea l with su ch threats  
when and as they arise.   
This is not to imply that SOF should demand all of NATO’s attention.  SOF alone 
should never be considered abso lute answers to all of the Alliance’s secu rity challenges.  
Nor does this thesis intend to im ply that NATO strategy is so poorly ar ticulated that it is 
destined to  cause a f ailure in m ilitary ope rations.  However, tr ansformation eff orts 
designed to  create a capability that can m eet the Alliance’s overarching security  
objectives require a well-form ulated strategy.  If NATO hopes to optim ize the strategic 
utility of SOF, it should consider the following recommendations: 
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-  Craft a s trategy do cument that reflects twenty-first centu ry secu rity concerns 
and that removes the am biguity found in the four current publicly available sources: 
NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, the 2004 Strategic Vision document, NATO’s Military 
Concept for Defense Against Terrorism , and NATO’s Com prehensive Political 
Guidance.  This will allow the Military Co mmittee to develop a revised MC 400 series 
document that f acilitates the dev elopment of SOF to m eet overarching Alliance security 
objectives. 
-  Require that troop contributing nations  for NATO SOF a gree to all potential 
methods of em ployment during the developm ent of Alliance strategy to  ensure that the 
SOF capabilities are no t ham strung during an operational commit ment by caveats  and  
“red cards.”  Lim itations on how a natio n’s forces can be em ployed during NATO 
operations have been imposed a number of times in the post-Cold War era, and they have 
made the Allies less ef fective than they m ight have been a t the tac tical and operatio nal 
levels. 
-  Elim inate consensus-based decision making below NATO’s highest political 
levels to remove the “slow and painful” process that General Jones referred to, especially 
in committees that provide guidance,  direction and oversight of SOF. 186  This is  critical 
because opp ortunities to  train and employ th ese specialized  forces during em erging or 
ongoing crises are often of li mited durati on.  A prolonged and excruciating decision 
making process is counterproductive in such scenarios. 
-  Delegate decision-m aking authority on SOF employment to SACEUR to avoid 
the bottlenecks that are so f requent in re aching consensus at political  levels at Supreme  
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).  Just as SACEUR ha s been delegated  
command authority in peacetime with NATO’s air defense, so too should he be delegated 
command authority regarding decisions to employ SOF in circumstances that he 
perceives as dem anding an imm ediate res ponse.  This would ensure that NATO SOF  
could be employed without the wrangling norm ally seen in the North Atlantic Council 
and would provide the Alliance ’s m ilitary le adership the f lexibility n eeded to e mploy 
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SOF appropriately—either independently or with conventional forces, taking greater 
advantage of the unique capabilities of SOF in both direct and indirect operations. 
-  Ensure that development of NATO SOF capability is given sufficient priority so 
that inadequate funding contributions will not jeopardize the initiative.  Chapter III noted 
that Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom  are the only European Allies  that view SOF 
as a prio rity capability for their arm ed forces, although all Allies perceive transnational 
and/or asymmetric threats as being the greatest in currently foreseeable circumstances. As 
many of the Allies co ntinue to u nderfund th eir respectiv e militaries com pared to the  
informally agreed two-p ercent of GDP benc hmark, there m ay be a temptation to reduce  
or elim inate funding for lower priority  m ilitary requirem ents.  Becau se only three 
European Allies perceive SOF as a prior ity requirement, a scenario can be envisage d in 
which the remaining Allies reduce or eliminate funding for SOF, thereby jeopardizing the 
NSTI on the whole. 
-  Place more emphasis on the need to conduct protracted forms of unconventional 
warfare and  require SOF troop con tributing nati ons to inco rporate th is capability into 
their SOF.  The greatest potential benefit of creating NATO SOF centers not on what can 
be brought to bear in DA and SR, but the pot ential strategic and operational success in 
the MA sphere.  NATO SOF can be employed in regions of strategic concern with regard 
to terrorism and extrem ism, can operate with a small footprint, and can be successful in 
operations that directly benefit NATO’s c ollective in struments of statecraft—the 
diplomatic, informational, military, and econom ic spheres.  By taking advantage of  the 
strategic benefits available in the unc onventional MA m ission set, NATO SOF can 
overcome challenges as sociated with the Alli ance’s s ecurity concerns today and in  the 
foreseeable future.   
There will always be a requirem ent to have resident DA and SR capabilities, but 
to focus solely on the se capabilities  would be  to disregard SOF roles and m issions that 
could have the greatest strate gic return and that could alig n the security  environment in 
volatile and unstable regions with NATO’s de sired end s tate.  The effectiveness of the 
United States and its NATO Allies and coalitio n partners in Af ghanistan can be used as 
the best example of this logic.  As o f this writing, military operations in Afghanistan are 
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well into their eighth year, and the security situation in  that country is visibly 
deteriorating in spite of  ISAF and U.S. ef forts to control it.   In the curr ent Afghanistan 
security environm ent, indirect m issions su ch as those associat ed with unconventional 
warfare have not only taken a back seat to direct missions, but have arguably been left 
behind.  This may be due in large part to the emphasis seemingly placed on direct action 
missions in which statistical measures of effectiveness can be derived from the number of 
insurgents killed or captured.   
In order to overcom e the many challenges li sted above and gain the benefits that 
may be realized through proper em ployment of SOF, NATO’s politi cal leadership must 
have a better understanding of the capabiliti es resident in SOF.  W ith such an 
understanding, the Alliance’s political lead ers can facilitate th e developm ent of 
comprehensive SOF capabilities and provide the military leadership the means to employ 
SOF to meet NATO’s political and security objectives. 
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